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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPLANTATION
BY
MARIÉTOU HABIBA LAÏSSA OUAYOGODÉ
August 2015
Committee Chair: Dr. Kurt E. Schnier
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation examines policy changes and incentive programs in kidney transplantation in the United
States (U.S.) and their effects on adult obesity, on provision of care, and on patients’ overall welfare. This
work uses rigorous identification strategies to quantify the impact, to investigate effectiveness, and to
identify potential unintended consequences related to the institution environment in transplantation.
Among others, findings are informative of a general understanding of weight loss behavior. Results also
provide understanding of trade‐offs—inherent in policy making—in this environment, which further affect
access to transplantation.
The first essay investigates effectiveness of weight loss incentives in transplantation. “How to incentivize
weight loss?” is one of the central questions in health economics research. An example with high stakes
is in the lifesaving treatment of organ transplantation, where transplantation centers use differential BMI
requirement as eligibility for transplantation. This chapter investigates the effects of BMI requirements
on probability of weight loss. Using a difference‐in‐difference framework correcting for sample selection
bias for deceased donor transplant recipients, I find that having an explicit BMI requirement causes a 16.1
percentage point increase in the probability of weight loss. Weight loss is documented not only for
overweight but also for severely and morbidly obese individuals. In addition, weight loss increases organ
transplant survival for the severely and morbidly obese.
The second essay evaluates the effects of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Final
Rule on transplantation on patient welfare. Effective on June 28, 2007, the CMS established a new
accountability policy for transplant centers to improve patient quality services and to reduce re‐
transplantation rates. Nonetheless, the regulation could exacerbate the current organ shortage problem.
This study uses variations across centers between 2002 and 2009, and finds evidence that the regulation
leads to undesirable effects on provision of care. The estimated decrease in graft failures for low‐
performing centers is negated by a decline in access to transplantation, creating a tradeoff between
quality and access in the provision of care. Results suggest a sizeable reduction of about 5 to 6 less
transplants per 6‐month period at low‐performing centers on both patient survival and graft survival
outcomes after the regulation. The estimated declines in volume do not translate into comparable
increases in volume at high‐performing centers.

The last essays emphasizes the effect of the CMS conditions of participations (CoPs) for transplant centers
on patients’ selection of transplant centers. I am concerned that the report cards published by the
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) may impact the centers patients’ selection to be placed
on the waiting list and the queuing of patients on a center’s waiting list. I construct a spatial data set of a
patient’s (and referring physicians’) choice set between 2003 and 2010. Results from this less competitive
model indicate that a center’s failure to meet the 1‐year organ transplant survival outcomes decreases
the probability that a patient will elect to be placed on a center’s waiting list versus those centers that are
spatial proximate to that center. Distance traveled to a center is found to reduce probability of listing at
a center, whereas the number of ECD transplants performed during any given year increase that
propensity. The regulation effects are purged out in sorting equilibrium models which account for
competitive interactions between centers. I find evidence for a strong congestion effect and demonstrate
importance of center‐level heterogeneity in predicting patient selection of centers.
In summary, this dissertation shows importance of altering individual’s trade‐offs in order to create
behavior change, more specifically with policies trying to alt obesity. It further shows in the case of
transplantation that the accountability policy established by the CMS mostly affects the supply side of the
market with greater impacts on transplants volume and access to transplantation than it does on the
demand for transplantation.
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Introduction
I.

Overview of the Research: Background and Importance of the Subject

1.

Prevalence of ESRD and Demand for Transplantation

End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) is the final stage of the five stages of kidney failure. Data on prevalent
counts and prevalence rates from the United States (U.S.) Renal Data System (USRDS) show an alarming
growth in the population with ESRD over the years: from 56,507 prevalent counts in 1980 to over 626,000
counts in 2012 (USRDS, 2014). The most affected group is the population aged 45 and older, a naturally
vulnerable group. Diabetes type II and hypertension are the reported leading causes of ESRD (USRDS
2014). Moreover, a dominant risk factor for both diabetes type II and hypertension is obesity, an
important national health concern (ADA, 2015).
ESRD patients have two ways to survive with this condition: dialysis treatment, a default treatment, and
kidney transplantation. According to the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (2013), the life expectancy
for patients on dialysis is about 5 years while “a living donor kidney functions, on average, 12 to 20 years,
and a deceased donor kidney from 8 to 12 years.” Transplantation is therefore an ideal treatment for
ESRD. This is a reason why researchers and policy makers join efforts in finding efficient ways to increase
access to transplantation. Nonetheless, solid organ transplantation is very costly. The Milliman Research
Institute (2008, 2011) estimated the total annual costs (not limited to surgical costs) associated with
obtaining renal transplantation at more than $50 billion in 2008 and 2011.1

I am grateful to the United Network for Organ Sharing (Data Request Number #013112‐2), as the contractor for the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, for providing the data. The interpretation and reporting of these data are the
responsibility of the author and in no way should be seen as an official policy of or interpretation by the OPTN or the U.S.
Government.
1 The estimated total monthly cost of obtaining a renal transplantation increased from $259,000 in 2008 and $262,900 in 2011
per episode. These estimates are based on charges associated with the 30 days prior to surgery and the 180 days following
transplantation: pre‐transplantation hospitalization, procurement services and hospital charges for the transplant, physician’s
fees, post‐transplant hospital admission, and cost of medication. The procedures performed were also estimated at 17,447 in
2008 and 16,571 in 2011 (Milliman, 2008 & 2011).
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Since organs supply relies heavily on deceased donors, which fall short of the increasing demand, the
environment surrounding organ transplantation is heavily regulated. Regulations from both the state and
the federal governments are put in place to make allocation, distribution, and transplantation of organs
secure, effective, and equitable (US DHHS, 2015). Transplant programs have also designed internal policies
in order to maximize patients’ outcomes. This dissertation examines policy changes and incentive
programs in kidney transplantation in the U.S. and their effects on adult obesity, on provision of and
access to care, and on patients’ overall welfare.
2.

Obesity and Transplantation

The alarming increase in the prevalence of obesity in the past decades to reach epidemic proportions has
paralleled the growth in ESRD in the U.S..: the rates of obesity have more than doubled since the 1980s.
According to Odgen et al. (2012), the 2009‐2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
(NHANES) reports one third of the U.S. adult (>20 years) population is obese (35.7%). Obesity increases
the risks for many chronic diseases including coronary heart disease, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes,
hypertension, sleep apnea and increases risks for cancers such as esophagus, pancreas, colon and rectum,
kidney, thyroid and gallbladder cancers (Ogden et al., 2012). In turn, diabetes and hypertension are the
two primary causes of ESRD.
Obesity may also be an independent cause of kidney disease (Kramer et al., 2006) and health hazards
associated with obesity increase mortality risks (McGinnis and Foeges, 1993; CDC, 2000‐2009). Not
surprisingly, observational studies finds that obesity is more prevalent in the ESRD population. Kramer et
al. (2006) found in their study of the ESRD incident adult population and a nationally representative
sample of the U.S. adult population that BMI increased at a faster rate in the ESRD population than in the
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U.S. population between 1995 and 2002.2 This evolution is driven by a rapid growth of severe and morbid
obesity. In the population aged 20 to 44 years, severely and morbidly obese individuals represented 6.4%
in 2002 in the U.S. population relative to a staggering 15.4% in the incident ESRD population. Given the
trends in obesity and the association between obesity and kidney failure, a growing number of overweight
and obese patients are being added every year to the deceased donor waiting list (DDWL) for kidney
transplantation in the U.S..
Moreover, studies based on single‐center data and large national registries demonstrated that high BMI
increases the risks for infection, delayed organ transplant function, prolonged hospitalization, acute organ
rejection episodes, and organ transplant loss (Modlin et al., 1997, Howard et al., 2002, Johnson et al.,
2002, Yamamoto et al., 2002, Gore et al., 2006, Cannon et al., 2013). As a result, many transplant centers
use BMI eligibility requirements for registration and/or transplantation to minimize obesity‐related
hazards following organ transplantation.3 Several programs now define severe and morbid obesity
(BMI≥35 kg/m2) as a contraindication for transplantation.4 Consequently, the BMI eligibility requirement
for listing and transplantation, a proxy for a weight‐loss intervention and a rationing device, provides an
incentive for transplant candidates to become healthier.
3.

Regulation and Transplantation

In addition to the effect of the growing demand accentuated by the influence of obesity, a recent change
in the regulatory environment surrounding organ transplantation might also affect access to
transplantation and exacerbate the organ shortage problem. In order to introduce accountability in
centers’ operations, the CMS has defined stringent rules for performance evaluation and oversight of

2

BMI is defined as the ratio of the individual’s weight in kilograms to their height in meter squared (kg/m2). It is used as a crude
measure of obesity and an indicator of health quality in the analysis.
3 This analysis will only pertain to the adult ESRD population on the waiting list for transplantation. Consequently, change in
weight will translate in change in BMI, which is defined as the ratio of the individual’s weight in kilograms to their height in meter
squared (kg/m2). BMI is used as a crude measure of obesity for the individual.
4 By convention, clinical obesity is defined as BMI≥30 kg/m2.
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transplant centers. Effective June 28, 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
established for the first time a set of Medicare Conditions of Participation (CoPs) for organ transplant
centers. These rules were enacted to ensure high quality transplants for participating centers: transplants
would be done in a safe and efficient manner. They also included provisions aimed at covering Medicare
reimbursement policies for Medicare patient transplants; approving and re‐approving centers for
Medicare coverage; and listing a set of provider responsibilities (CMS, 2007).
The CMS Final Rule also mandates public reports on performance of transplant centers to provide quality
assurance to patients. These mandatory public reports ensure that healthcare information is available to
the public so as to facilitate informed decision making (Schold et al., 2013). Centers have to abide by the
CMS new standards for operations, for data submission, and for clinical experience. Increasing concerns
are now voiced that the regulation could adversely affect organ utilization rates and, therefore, the supply
of organs available for transplantation (Schnier et al. 2013; Schnier et al. 2014a). Access to transplantation
could therefore be affected by the regulation.
II.

Statement of the Problem and Contribution

Shortages in markets are a function of demand and supply. It is reasonable to believe that access to and
rate of transplantation will also be influenced by factors other than the organ supply, including the
demand and the regulatory environment. This dissertation contributes to the literature by examining
three questions that have yet to be addressed in the current literature on policy evaluation and incentive
programs focusing on the ESRD population. Given the numerous and relatively unsuccessful policy
measures to alter individual behavior in the fight against obesity, I first seek to investigate behavioral
response of ESRD obese patients to stronger incentives in kidney transplantation. Secondly, I examine
importance of the regulatory environment governing kidney transplantation with a thorough investigation
of the anticipated and unintended effects of the recent accountability policy for transplant centers.
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Finally, I explore whether ESRD patients take advantage of quality information on transplant centers when
choosing where to enroll. Therefore, the effects of the regulation on both the supply and the demand for
transplantation are investigated.
III. Research Questions
The first chapter draws attention to a growing segment of the ESRD population, the obese. I investigate
the effects of BMI requirements on probability of weight loss of transplant candidates. Behavior changes
measured with weight loss in response to BMI eligibility requirements are analyzed. I compare the
changes in weight measured with BMI for transplant candidates registered at centers with an explicit BMI
requirement with those enrolled at centers not enforcing such rules. Long term effects of the weight‐loss
incentives on organ transplant survival is further studied. Due to data limitation, the scope of this study
does not cover ESRD patients that are not registered on the waiting list for kidney transplantation.
In the second chapter, I turn my attention to the CMS CoPs for transplant centers as described by the Final
Rule on transplantation. I conduct a program evaluation of theis accountability policy on access to care
and quality of care provided. Outcomes from low performing centers are contrasted to those performing
above the CMS standards before and after the regulation. I study several health outcomes including
transplants volume, organ transplant failures, waiting list deaths, removal from the waiting list for other
causes, and patient registrations volume.
The last chapter extends further on the influence of the CMS regulation on patient registration on a
center’s waiting list. In this co‐authored work, I seek to understand the decision process behind choice of
transplant centers by patients in quest of transplantation. I attempt to describe, explain and predict center
choice by analyzing the importance of the regulation among other factors in determining spatial sorting
across centers. I ultimately study how this process could affect access to transplantation.

5

Chapter I: Effectiveness of Weight‐Loss Incentives in Transplantation
This chapter studies a weight‐loss intervention for transplant candidates in the U.S.. The stakes are
extremely high in this intervention and the incentives offered to patients are a reduced wait time and
transplantation. Expectancy theories of motivation postulate that there is a positive relationship between
the amount of effort exerted and the value of the performance reward (Naylor et al., 1980). For patients
living with ESRD, obese and non‐obese, the ideal outcome is transplantation. Nonetheless, most people
fail in their attempt to lose weight (Cawley and Price, 2009). I therefore evaluate effectiveness of a BMI
criterion used by transplant programs and weight loss with the incentive of transplantation. Findings in
this analysis will be informative of a general understanding of weight loss behavior.
Before I analyze changes in BMI of transplant candidates in response to BMI thresholds implemented at
transplant centers, I first revisit the literature and attempt to estimate a causal relationship between
obesity and patient waiting times. Using a hazard model, obesity is found to significantly reduce the
likelihood of transplantation. Results indicate that the probability of exiting penalty for severe and morbid
obesity is 19.28 percentage points for deceased donor transplants and 20.53 percentage points for living
donor transplants relative to the lowest obesity level (30≤BMI<35).
With this in mind, I apply a regression‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference framework with correction for
sample selection bias for deceased donor transplant recipients between 1990 and 2010. I find that the
probability of weight loss increases by about 16.1 percentage points at centers with a BMI threshold. And
transplant recipients lose an average of 1.24 Kg/m2 in presence of BMI requirements. Severely and
morbidly obese patients also experience a significant increase in the probability of weight loss by 6.4
percentage points at centers where the threshold is binding. Exploiting variation in BMI thresholds across
centers, I find that transplant candidates are more responsive to stringent BMI policies. Transplant
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candidates clearly exhibit weight loss behavior consistent with the objective of obtaining an organ
transplant as a result of the BMI criteria.
Focusing on post‐transplant outcomes, additional weight loss as a result of BMI requirements decreases
the probability of patient graft failure (i.e. allograft or organ transplant failure) for the severely and
morbidly obese. Shorter wait times are associated with higher survival rates (Meier‐Kriesche et al., 2000)
and other things equal, patients who lose weight in response to a BMI threshold, experience shorter wait
times to transplantation. Thus, a strength of this analysis is that it provides additional insights on ways to
improve the organ allocation process and well‐being of patients. Improvements in this process would aim
at maximizing the quality‐adjusted life years (estimated at 8 to 12 years for a deceased donor transplant
compared to about 5 years with dialysis (Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 2013)) that cadaveric‐
organ‐donor‐transplant patients would gain with transplantation.
I.

Literature Review

While no study has examined the effectiveness of weight‐loss interventions for the ESRD population
plagued by obesity, only one study to my knowledge analyzed the effect of obesity on transplantation.
Segev et al. (2008) investigated the influence of obesity on physicians’ decision to accept kidney offers for
transplantation. They find using a duration model that between 1995 and 2006 obesity decreases the
hazard of deceased donor transplantation for patients with severe and morbid obesity by 28% to 44%
over the baseline (healthy weight) hazard, and increases these patients’ prospect of being bypassed for
organ offers by 4% to 23%. The present analysis augments Segev et al. (2008)’s study by using of a longer
time period (1990‐2010) and by investigating additional transition routes from the waiting list. This study
also allows for a stronger connection to be made between obesity and transplantation.
Although the stakes involved are not necessarily comparable, this intervention is related to weight loss
incentive programs used in the workplace environment. Since obesity‐related costs may partly be borne
7

by businesses through employer‐sponsored health insurance (Cawley and Price, 2013), productivity loss
(Wolf and Colditz, 1998), and job absenteeism (Cawley et al. 2007), many employers offer financial
incentives through worksite health promotion programs to help employees make healthier choices and
lose weight.5 The real cost of obesity‐related absenteeism between 2000 and 2004 has been estimated to
$2.28 billion (Cawley et al. 2007), while the total economic (real) costs including direct medical costs and
productivity loss was estimated at $65.09 billion in the U.S. (Wolf and Colditz, 1998).6,7 As a result, by 2013
99% of U.S. large firms (i.e. 200 or more employees) compared to 76% of small firms offered at least one
specified wellness program, and among employers offering health benefits, 58% of large firms and 31%
of small firms offered weight loss programs (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013).
Nevertheless, results on effectiveness of such interventions suggest little effect on weight loss. Cawley
and Price (2013) use data on 24 real‐world worksites weight‐loss interventions on individuals with excess
weight only and documented modest weight loss and extremely high attrition with the financial incentives
used in their programs. Related studies conducted outside the workplace also found moderate to no effect
of weight‐loss interventions (Volpp et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2007; Burger and Lynham, 2010). This
chapter contributes to the growing literature on effectiveness of weight‐loss interventions by focuses on
a different and relatively costly population (i.e. ESRD patients) that faces a non‐financial but much
stronger incentive (i.e. the gift of life with transplantation) to examine effectiveness of a weight loss
program for transplant candidates. An analysis of this specific population provides additional information
on weight loss behavior in general by assessing potency of stronger incentives. The remainder of the
chapter is structured as follows. Section I provides some background information on the transplantation
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Employees may end up bearing these costs in the form of lower wages (Cawley and Price, 2013).
Cawley and coauthors report an annual nominal estimate of $4.3 billion in 2004 U.S. dollars. The real estimate is calculated
using the average annual consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI2004=188.9) with 1982‐84 as the base year, published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2013).
7 Wolf and Colditz (1998) find the total cost attributable to obesity to be $99.2 billion in 1995 dollars. The 1995 CPI index, used
for calculation, is 152.4 (BLS, 2013).
6
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process and weight‐loss intervention. Section II presents the data used. Sections III and IV detail the
empirical analyses and results, followed by a discussion.
II.

Background

In general, an ESRD patient is referred to a transplant program by their nephrologist or through self‐
referral. Before acceptance on a center’s waiting list, a potential candidate goes through an evaluation
process based on some eligibility criteria, which differ across centers. Provided they have no other
particular health condition precluding transplantation, candidates remain on the waiting list until a
(donor) match is obtained. Organ offers are made to the patient’s physician who can reject or accept the
organ for transplantation on behalf of their patient (Howard, 2002).8 The wait time process is a little
different for living donor recipients. Although they follow the same evaluation process, they usually do
not have to endure the anguish of waiting for an organ offer and to experience the accept/reject decision
of physicians: living donation reduces wait time considerably. The BMI threshold for transplantation is
therefore more binding for cadaveric organ transplantation.
Although, patient’s BMI is not used in the allocation of kidneys, it has been established in the medical
literature that BMI influences the prospect of transplantation when factoring in the physician’s decision
to provide surgical treatment to obese patients (Segev et al., 2008; Lentine et al., 2012). Obesity is deemed
to be a reversible risk factor. Weight gain is a common phenomenon post transplantation and could be
exacerbated by pre‐transplant obesity, making it more desirable for physicians to favor a healthier weight
pre‐transplantation (Lentine et al., 2012). In addition, there is great heterogeneity in the BMI‐based
eligibility criteria for listing and transplantation across programs: while several centers enforce a BMI
cutoff of 35, others are more flexible and use a cutoff above 40 for example as a contraindication for

8

Patients are only informed whenever an organ offer is accepted and the physician proceeds with transplantation.
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transplantation. Centers with no explicit BMI threshold might still require weight loss for obese patients
depending on how they carry their weight.
Moreover, transplant programs sometimes offer a weight loss program including bariatric surgery to BMI‐
ineligible patients before they could be listed for transplantation.9 However, each case is evaluated
separately and some patients are registered as an exception with weight loss as a prerequisite for
transplantation. Such patients are listed as “inactive” but still accrue wait time until they lose enough
weight to meet the center’s requirement.10 During inactive listing, any cadaveric organ offer is more likely
to be turned down by the physician or transplant program. Inactive listing can be treated as a pre‐
commitment and incentive device for encouraging weight loss for obese candidates. The accept/reject
decision process on cadaveric organ offer is identified as a mechanism through which the BMI threshold
affects wait time of potential deceased donor transplant candidates.
Beside risk factors such as obesity, other potential barriers to transplantation include the regulatory
environment in which centers operate and racial disparities in access to transplantation. Effective on June
28, 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has established a new set of rules for
monitoring and for creating more performance accountability for transplant centers (CMS, 2007).
Nonetheless, there are concerns that the regulation provisions for sanctioning low‐performing centers
could further limit access to transplantation (Schnier et al., 2014a).11 Racial disparities in accessing
transplantation also exist and researchers have proposed potential explanations for differential
treatments that include differences in genetic factors, environmental, socioeconomic, behavioral,

9 BMI ineligible ESRD patients not listed could always lose weight in an attempt to be eligible for listing. Moreover, very heavy
patients are required at times to lose weight before going through bariatric surgery. And success of this procedure resides in the
individual’s willingness and ability to sustain the weight lost as a result of surgery.
10 The period of inactivity on the waiting list is relatively short but could vary and last for years (at least 2 years): by 2008, the
proportion of inactive patients totaled about a third of the waiting list for organ transplantation and 33% for kidney transplant
candidates (Stein, 2008).
11 As part of the risk‐adjustment models used to evaluate performance on graft and patient survival outcomes, centers receive
negative risk‐compensation for transplantation on patients with a BMI exceeding 30kg/m2 (SRTR, 2012).
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psychosocial, and cultural factors (Powe, 2003; Soucie et al., 1992; Alexander and Sehgal, 1998; Gaylin et
al., 1993; Kaufman and Cooper, 1999). In order to disentangle the effect of obesity, these potential
confounding factors (i.e. the CMS Final Rule and patient’s race‐ethnicity) will be controlled for in the
analysis.12
III. Data
This study uses data collected by the United Network for Organ Sharing Standard Transplant Analysis
Research (UNOS STAR) on ESRD patients registered on the DDWL for Kidney transplantation between
1990 and 2010. UNOS STAR collects information on transplant candidates including basic demographics
(gender, race, age at listing, blood type, educational attainment, BMI) that are provided on the
registration forms at transplant centers.13 Information is also available on patients’ medical conditions at
listing (diabetes, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), computed panel reactive
antibodies (PRA), medical urgency, and functional status for performance of daily activities), primary
insurance, and dates of registration and removal from the waiting list.14,15,16 The outcomes of interest in
the first part of the analysis include mutually exclusive transitions from the waiting list: deceased donor
transplantation, living donor transplantation, death, and de‐listing (i.e. removal from the waiting list) for

12

Both 1) the high prevalence of obesity in minority populations and 2) the increase possibility of transplant centers taking a
number of actions, in order to comply with the Final Rule, to the detriment of high risk patients (Howard et al., 2009) create a
considerable degree of correlation between these factors.
13 Clinical information including weight and height used to compute a patient’s BMI are reported by the medical personnel.
14 Hypertension, one of the main causes for ESRD, is very prevalent in the population of transplant candidates. More than 70% of
my sample, registered prior to January 1 2007, was reported to take medication for treating this condition. However, starting on
January 1 2007, the variable was no longer recorded on the patient registration form. Given the importance of this condition, I
use the sample mean prior to January 1 2007 to impute values for all registrations beyond that date (27.46% of the sample).
15 Panel reactive antibody (PRA) is a blood test that indicates the degree of sensitization or degree to which the patient will react
immunologically to transplantation. It ranges between 0 and 100 and the higher the PRA, the more likely the immune system of
the individual is to fight a foreign body and increase likelihood of rejection. Individuals with PRA greater than 80 are labeled as
highly sensitized. Factors increasing the risk of being sensitized include multiple pregnancies, multiple blood transfusions,
previous transplant, and very rarely, viral/bacterial infections (OPTN, 2012). Highly sensitized transplant candidates have the
lowest probability of receiving a cross‐match negative organ based on standard allocation procedures. Prior to the era of
immunosuppressive drugs, priority was given to highly sensitized patients in order to help reduce the difference in rate of access
to transplantation (OPTN, 2012).
16 Beside disability and age, ESRD is one of the eligibility requirements for Medicare health insurance coverage (CMS, 2012).
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all other causes.17 The UNOS STAR data records information on patients’ registration date in (dd, mm, yy)
format and date of removal from the waiting list if applicable. This information is exploited to compute
the "

_ _

, " the dependent variable for the different exits or censors. Patients who are still

waiting at the end of the study period are included in the analysis and their time on the waiting list is
computed as the difference between their placement date on the list and the end of the study period
(September 3, 2010).
In the second part of the analysis, weight change is the main outcome of interest. An advantage of the
UNOS STAR data is that it provides a second measure of BMI for patients at the time of transplantation.
This allows measurement of an individual’s willingness to lose weight and success in weight loss prior to
transplantation. Since there is no information on the BMI after placement on the list for candidates still
awaiting transplantation or for those removed via transition routes other than transplantation, this
section of the study will focus only on the population of transplant recipients for analyzing effectiveness
of the intervention.18 Nonetheless, the possibility for sample selection bias will be accounted for in the
estimation. Weight change is measured using BMI at transplant minus BMI at listing. A second measure
for weight change is defined as an indicator that takes the value of one if the difference between patient’s
BMI at the two points of reference is negative and is zero otherwise.
Identification of centers with a BMI threshold required an extensive search and data collection using
websites information for all programs in the analysis. In addition, centers that did not publish information
online on BMI requirement were contacted by phone.19 Additional restriction on the data required non‐

17

The number of waiting list deaths includes individuals who are removed from the waiting list for cause of death before
receiving transplantation and those removed for being “too sick to transplant.”
18 Unfortunately, no additional information is available on any BMI transition between these two points of reference, listing and
transplantation.
19 For each center, the corresponding website was assessed and specific keywords and phrases were searched including
“transplantation”, “kidney transplantation”, “kidney transplantation and BMI”, “kidney transplant evaluation criteria”, “pre‐
transplant eligibility requirements”, “transplantation indications”, and “transplantation contraindications”; in order to get
information on BMI eligibility requirements. This information was supplemented with phone calls to transplant programs to know
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missing values for BMI at transplant for the patient’s information to be used in this part of the analysis.
This resulted in exclusion in the second part of the investigation of 35,625 transplant recipients—both
from living and cadaveric donors—about 17.4% of all transplant recipients in the sample. Moreover, the
613 transplant recipients who changed centers between listing and transplantation are excluded. From
1990 to 2010, a few centers have withdrawn their programs as designated for kidney transplantation or
have discontinued their transplant programs altogether (55 centers representing about 6% of deceased
donor transplant recipient registrations used in this section). These centers are included as controls in the
main analysis.20 The intervention variable is defined as an indicator for a BMI threshold that is equal to
one whenever there is an explicit BMI used in the evaluation process as a contraindication for
transplantation. The main caveat is that this variable is not retrospective. Although eligibility criteria for
registration and transplantation could change over time, information obtained from phone calls to center
suggest that changes are uncommon in the period under investigation. So, an explicit BMI threshold
currently used by a program is a good indicator for historical practices and policies.
Individuals are censored when they exit from the waiting list. Consequently, behavior past this point
cannot be examined. Nevertheless, patient graft failure—a post‐transplant outcome—provides a basis for
additional evaluation of the long‐term benefits of the intervention. Graft failure post transplantation is
used to define two binary variables equal to one if the kidney transplant “failed” 1) within the first year
or 2) within the first 3 years after transplantation and zero otherwise.21
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 focuses mainly on the entire
sample of transplant candidates and the different exits or censors under investigation in the first part of

the exact level of the BMI used as a threshold and potential changes overtime. All but 6 centers (with less than 5% of all transplant
recipients) provided the requested information. For these 6 centers, I used information collected online as the current policies.
20
In regressions not shown here, these centers were excluded and did not affects findings for the severely and morbidly obese.
21 The graft failure within the first year and within the first three years after transplant are defined following the criteria used by
the SRTR in reviewing performance of transplant centers. In their performance review, the SRTR uses 1‐year and 3‐year
performance measures to evaluate transplant programs based on their graft survival outcomes and patient survival outcomes.
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Table 1‐ Descriptive Statistics of Patient Registrations (1990 to 2010)
Deceased Donor
Transplant

Variables

Living Donor
Transplant

Death

Other Causes

Still Waiting

Mean

Std. Dev

Mean

Std. Dev

Mean

Std. Dev

Mean

Std. Dev

Mean

Std. Dev

Time to Transition

648.95

(613.21)

314.12

(353.66)

973.70

(816.12)

954.95

(857.10)

856.30

(821.57)

Difference in BMI between Transplant and Lis ng†

0.204

(3.492)

‐0.039

(3.049)

Weight Loss ( =1 if BMI at Transplant < BMI at Lis ng)†

0.462

(0.499)

0.511

(0.500)

Gra Failed within 1 year(=1 if gra failed)†

0.070

(0.255)

0.029

(0.168)

Graft Failed within 3 years(=1 if gra failed)†

0.116

(0.321)

0.057

(0.232)

BMI at Listing

26.633

(5.459)

26.784

(5.473)

27.219

(5.900)

26.699

(5.833)

28.685

(5.961)

Normal (BMI < 25)

0.428

(0.495)

0.416

(0.493)

0.396

(0.489)

0.446

(0.497)

0.295

(0.456)

Overweight (25≤BMI<30)

0.328

(0.469)

0.329

(0.470)

0.320

(0.467)

0.310

(0.462)

0.322

(0.467)

Obese (30≤BMI<35)

0.171

(0.376)

0.175

(0.380)

0.183

(0.387)

0.152

(0.359)

0.232

(0.422)

Severely & Morbidly Obese (BMI≥35)

0.074

(0.261)

0.079

(0.270)

0.101

(0.301)

0.092

(0.289)

0.151

(0.358)

Age at Listing

47.528

(13.055)

45.081

(13.434)

52.867

(12.057)

47.756

(13.401)

50.435

(12.960)

Female

0.390

(0.488)

0.404

(0.491)

0.416

(0.493)

0.418

(0.493)

0.411

(0.492)

White

0.529

(0.499)

0.650

(0.477)

0.479

(0.500)

0.486

(0.500)

0.383

(0.486)

Black

0.283

(0.451)

0.157

(0.363)

0.319

(0.466)

0.291

(0.454)

0.344

(0.475)

Hispanic

0.120

(0.325)

0.134

(0.340)

0.135

(0.342)

0.140

(0.347)

0.184

(0.387)

Obesity Clinical Classification at Listing

Ethnicity

Asian

0.048

(0.213)

0.042

(0.200)

0.040

(0.196)

0.060

(0.237)

0.070

(0.254)

Other Ethnicity

0.020

(0.141)

0.018

(0.132)

0.027

(0.161)

0.023

(0.151)

0.020

(0.141)

0.360

(0.434)

0.466

(0.487)

0.320

(0.445)

0.349

(0.442)

0.400

(0.486)

Highly Sensitized (=1 if highly sensitized)

0.029

(0.147)

0.018

(0.099)

0.048

(0.188)

0.043

(0.179)

0.042

(0.189)

Diabetes

0.323

(0.418)

0.277

(0.431)

0.530

(0.476)

0.456

(0.462)

0.420

(0.489)

College Education
Medical Condition at Listing

Hypertension

0.825

(0.315)

0.830

(0.308)

0.836

(0.322)

0.827

(0.318)

0.835

(0.154)

Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD)

0.009

(0.096)

0.008

(0.085)

0.018

(0.127)

0.012

(0.097)

0.011

(0.103)

Medicare (=1 if primary insurance at listing is Medicare)

0.487

(0.453)

0.296

(0.442)

0.550

(0.476)

0.473

(0.464)

0.454

(0.495)

CMS Final Rule

0.010

(0.101)

0.024

(0.152)

0.010

(0.097)

0.016

(0.125)

0.075

(0.263)

Observations

150782

53909

61858

33579

76854

Notes: N=376,982 Registrations. †The sample used for part 2 of the analysis is reduced to 122,683 patients with deceased donor transplants and 45,770 patients with living donor transplants
between 1990 and 2010. The difference in BMI between transplantation and listing is calculated as BMI at transplant‐BMI at listing.

the analysis. Summary statistics are also provided for individuals, who are yet to transition from the active
waiting list. The analysis uses a sample 274 centers and 376,982 ESRD patient registrations—the units of
14

observation—seeking transplantation between 1990 and 2010. There are 300,128 exits and 76,854 right‐
censored spells (i.e. spells that have not yet ended by the end of the study period, the active waiting list)
between 1990 and 2010. The mean wait time for deceased donor transplant recipients is about 2 years,
while the wait time is reduced in half for living donor transplant recipients.
The proportion of obese (BMI≥30) in the sample is relatively lower (about 28%) than in the general
population—about 1/3rd of the population—because some obese, especially severely and morbidly obese,
ESRD patients are not eligible for registration due to the BMI thresholds imposed at several transplant
programs.22 The proportion of obese transplant candidates is therefore not entirely representative of the
population of obese ESRD patients. The typical transplant candidate in the sample is an overweight
(25≤BMI<30) white male of about 49 years of age. Relative to Whites and Hispanics, African‐American or
Black patients are disproportionally higher on the waiting list (about 28%) relative to the national
population (nearly 13%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). These proportions could be partly justified by a higher
prevalence of obesity in minority populations (i.e. Blacks and Hispanics), leading to higher incidence of
ESRD in these populations. As a general pattern across all chronic diseases (i.e. diabetes, hypertension,
and COPD) and high sensitization (PRA≥80), individuals with these conditions represent a higher fraction
of total waiting list deaths.23
An indicator variable for the change in the regulatory environment,

, takes the value of

one if the patient’s listing center has been flagged for low performance on either total patient or total
graft survival outcomes in the most recent report of the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR)

22

Four BMI categories are defined: 1) normal weight category aggregates healthy weight and underweight categories (BMI<25)
as the latter category is relatively small; 2) overweight (25≤BMI<30); 3) obese (30≤BMI<35); and 4) severely and morbidly
obese (BMI≥35).This chapter uses the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention BMI classifications (CDC, 2010a; CDC, 2011)
and combines the underweight (BMI<18 kg/m2) and healthy weight (18≤BMI<25) categories into the “normal weight” category,
the reference category throughout the analysis. Severe obesity and morbid obesity are also combined in this analysis because of
the BMI‐requirements imposed on individuals with BMI≥35.
23 Patient’s PRA is obtained from information provided by the transplant candidate’s calculated PRA at listing. If missing, the
candidate’s PRA is replaced by the value of the “first current PRA” or by the “peak PRA” at listing provided the first two values
are missing.

15

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Before (at Listing) and After (at Transplant) Intervention for Deceased
Donor Transplant Recipients (1990‐2010)
At Listing
Control
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev

At Transplantation

Treated
Mean

P‐Value

Std. Dev

Control

Treated

P‐Value

Mean

Std. Dev

Mean

Std. Dev

Difference in BMI between
Listing and Transplant

0.264

(3.599)

0.184

(3.458)

0.0006

Weight Loss

0.454

(0.498)

0.465

(0.499)

0.0009***

Graft Failure within 1 year

0.077

(0.266)

0.067

(0.251)

0.0000***

Graft Failure within 3 years

0.127

(0.333)

0.113

(0.317)

0.0000***

BMI

26.645

(5.571)

26.746

(5.425)

0.0050***

26.908

(5.594)

26.931

(5.452)

0.5355

Normal

0.431

(0.495)

0.417

(0.493)

0.0000***

0.409

(0.492)

0.401

(0.490)

0.0119**

Overweight

0.326

(0.469)

0.331

(0.471)

0.0633*

0.331

(0.471)

0.335

(0.472)

0.1541

Obese

0.165

(0.371)

0.178

(0.382)

0.0000***

0.175

(0.380)

0.183

(0.386)

0.0030

Severely & Morbidly Obese

0.079

(0.269)

0.074

(0.262)

0.0153**

0.085

(0.279)

0.081

(0.273)

0.0347**

Age at Listing

47.772

(13.199)

47.727

(13.055)

0.6087

Female

0.390

(0.488)

0.392

(0.488)

0.5898

White

0.547

(0.498)

0.521

(0.500)

0.0000***

Black

0.278

(0.448)

0.285

(0.452)

0.0111**

BMI Classification

Ethnicity

Hispanic

0.103

(0.304)

0.128

(0.334)

0.0000***

Asian

0.050

(0.218)

0.047

(0.212)

0.0365**

Other Ethnicity

0.023

(0.150)

0.019

(0.137)

0.0000***

0.358

(0.428)

0.367

(0.442)

0.0014***

Highly sensitized

0.028

(0.150)

0.028

(0.147)

0.8403

Diabetes

0.315

(0.416)

0.310

(0.424)

0.1217

Hypertension

0.833

(0.308)

0.824

(0.316)

0.0001***

COPD

0.009

(0.090)

0.010

(0.091)

0.1864

Medicare

0.495

(0.450)

0.475

(0.460)

0.0000***

Observations

29,797

College Education

Medical Condition at Listing

92,886

29,797
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92,886

in the period after the regulation effective date. Registrations at low‐performing centers in the post‐
regulation period represent about 2.6% of all registrations in my sample. The relatively high proportion of
obese (

30) patients still awaiting transplantation at the end of the study period could be indicative

of a negative effect of obesity on the likelihood of transplantation.
Table 2 provides further information on BMI in levels and BMI classification at registration and at
transplantation in control and treated centers (i.e. programs with a BMI threshold) for 122,683 deceased
donor recipients; the population of interest for the weight‐loss intervention. This restriction reduces the
number of centers in this section to 257. Outcomes of 98 centers with no reported BMI threshold (the
control group) are compared to those of 159 centers with an explicit BMI eligibility criterion for the
difference‐in‐difference analysis. When comparing unconditional differences in the change in BMI
between listing and transplant the means are not statistically different across groups.24 Nonetheless,
difference in the indicator for weight loss suggest that a slightly larger proportion of transplant candidates
at centers with a BMI requirement experience weight loss during their wait time. Similarity across centers
can be justified by two counteracting forces at play when considering transplantation of the obese: 1)
because allocation of kidney depends on medical urgency/priority patients, patients with higher medical
urgency, critical status or those completely debilitated by the disease are transplanted faster to avoid
further deterioration in health; 2) the BMI criteria restrict access to transplantation and provide incentives
to lose weight. Thus, further analysis is needed for a more accurate evaluation of the weight loss
intervention.

24

The decrease in BMI can be qualified as a sustainable weight loss because the average wait time to transplantation is about 2
years for deceased donor transplants and about a year for living donor transplants.
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Figure 1: Kaplan‐Meier Estimates by Risks
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Additional comparison of means in Table 2 suggests statistically different graft failure rates for cadaveric
donor transplant recipients across treated and untreated centers. In fact, the graft failure rates within the
first year and within the first three years post‐transplant are relatively lower for patients registered at
treated centers (6.7% and 11.3%, respectively) compared to those of their counterparts registered at
untreated centers (7.7% and 12.7%, respectively). Focusing on the 1‐year and 3‐year graft survival rate
measures is consistent with the CMS Conditions of Participation regulations.
In estimating duration models in the first part of the analysis, the first step includes an evaluation of the
trends in transitions from the waiting list. A more complete illustration of these trends for each BMI
category can be seen in Figure 1 of the Kaplan Meier hazard estimates by risks.25 The Kaplan Meier
estimates in Figure 1 assume homogeneity of the different BMI subsamples; there is neither observable
nor unobservable heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Consistent across all BMI categories,
transplant candidates have a higher probability of transitioning from the waiting list via deceased donor
transplantation than from any other exit route as time to transition increases. Moreover, the probability
of transitioning through deceased donor transplantation is lower at all points for individuals in the highest
BMI category relative to all other categories.26 This is the first suggestive evidence that severe and morbid
obesity precludes transplantation. In the following section, I examines the determinants of waiting list
transitions.

25

The Kaplan Meier is the product limit estimator of the survivor function, which represents the probability that duration of a
certain outcome evaluated at time equals or exceeds (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
26 This is consistent with a relatively higher proportion of obese candidates still waiting to transition as time increases in Figure
1.
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IV. BMI Classification and Transitions from the Waiting List
1.

Empirical Strategy

I examine the role played by a patient’s BMI at registration on transitions from the waiting list. Provided
that transplant candidates get de‐listed for multiple reasons such as deceased donor transplantation,
living donor transplantation, death, and other causes, it is important to account for all these transitions
for accuracy of the estimated effects. For estimation purposes, a duration model is warranted for handling
issues including censoring with individuals that are yet to transition at the end of the study period.
Although one could estimate a competing risk model, where the main interest is the transition from the
waiting list—a model in which any de‐listing route becomes a competing risk of exit—I am interested
instead in the mechanism that causes each particular transition in general. When emphasizing one
particular event, the mechanism of interest is modeled by treating all other events as censored and each
transition route is modeled separately. The analysis also relies on a semi‐parametric estimation
technique—a Cox proportional hazard (CPH)—that does not make any distributional assumption about
the hazard. Hence, the CPH requires less complete distributional specification than parametric techniques
and reduces sensitivity of the estimates to an assumed shape of the distribution of spells (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005).
The likelihood of each transition route is set as a function of binary variables indicating BMI classification
at listing, patient’s characteristics, and a set of covariates relevant for organ allocation. The hazard is
assumed to be of the form:
exp

&
(1)

Where

age at listing, age square, gender, education attainment, medical urgency,
functional status, comorbidities, blood type, sensitization, insurance
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The function

denotes the baseline hazard and is a function of time alone. Each regression controls

for year effects and transplant center fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the center level to
account for a shared experience, including the type of treatment services, organ donor pool, organ
acceptance policies, and eligibility criteria for transplantation at the center.
2.

Estimation Results

Results from the different estimations are presented in Table 3 and hazard ratios are reported for each
exit. Distinguishing between BMI classifications, the likelihood of getting a transplant decreases as one
accumulates excess weight. This is consistent with the Kaplan Meier estimates in Figure 1. All else
constant, obesity decreases the hazard of getting a deceased donor transplant by 3.14% and 22.42% over
the baseline hazard for the lowest level of obesity and severe and morbid obesity, respectively.27 These
effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. There is an additional penalty on obesity for living
donor transplantation with a decrease in the hazards by 6.53% and 27.06% over the associated baseline
hazard, respectively.28 The indirect effect of obesity through chronic diseases such as diabetes,
hypertension and COPD also implies that candidates with these conditions are at a disadvantage for
transplantation in general. Results provide evidence for a negative and significant effect of obesity on the
prospect of transplantation.
Emphasizing negative waiting‐list outcomes including de‐listings for cause of death and all other causes,
here also, obesity decreases the hazards of transitioning through these routes. Although these results
might seem counterintuitive because of priors of a positive relationship between obesity, mortality and
health complications (Flegal et al. 2007), an important explanation resides in the extensive medical

27

The baseline hazard for each exit is approximated with the average probability of failure per day on the waiting list.
In a regression not shown here, severely and morbidly obesity is disaggregated into two categories and the model in equation
(1) is estimated. Estimates for the influence of BMI classification at listing on deceased donor transplantation are slightly higher
than Segev et al. (2008) estimates because a longer time period is used and additional controls are included in the model such as
medical priority and functional status at listing, but estimates are in the range of Segev et al. (2008) earlier results.
28
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screening and BMI restrictions at listing for obese ESRD patients. Additional suggestive evidence is
presented in Figure A1 when comparing the BMI distributions in the UNOS STAR sample and a
representative sample of the U.S. population from the NHANES between 1999 and 2010. Turning
attention to the general trend in density, the difference in distribution of BMI across the two populations
is consistent with a higher prevalence of ESRD in the population of individuals with excess weight.
Moreover, the relatively fat right tail in the NHANES sample substantiates the impact of BMI restrictions
on registration of obese ESRD patients. These differences in distribution could also indicate a higher
prevalence of death and medical unsuitability for transplantation for example in the population of ESRD
obese patients who never gets to be eligible for listing.29 Nonetheless, the indirect effect of obesity
through chronic diseases (i.e. diabetes, COPD) increases the likelihood of transplant candidates dying on
the waiting or being delisted for causes other than transplantation and death.
Besides the ongoing debates on obesity and transplantation, there have also been concerns about
disparities across races/ethnicities in getting transplantation (Kaufman and Cooper, 1999; Powe 2003;
Klassen et al., 2002). Not controlling for additional biological characteristics (i.e. antigens) results indicate
that relative to Whites, belonging to a minority ethnicity decreases the hazard for both deceased donor
and living donor transplantations. Focusing on cadaveric donor transplantation, the highest penalty is
estimated for Black candidates with a reduction of 23.07% over the baseline hazard (Table 3). Most
coefficient estimates on races/ethnicities are statistically different from zero. Based on these results, one
would be tempted to evoke discrimination or racial bias as an explanation for such disparities. However,
these outcomes could be justified by the particular antigens that certain race ethnicities carry. These
disparities could instead be just differences in access.

29

Not controlling for functional status and medical urgency could lead to a spurious positive effect of obesity on likelihood of
de‐listings for causes other than transplantation.
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Table 3: Duration Model of Transitions from the DDWL‐Hazard Ratios
Variables
Overweight at Listing
Obese at Listing

Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing

Deceased Donor
Transplant

Living Donor
Transplant

Death

Other Causes

1.0057

1.0190*

0.8370***

0.8577***

(0.0073)

(0.0117)

(0.0086)

(0.0136)

0.9686***

0.9347***

0.7951***

0.7141***

(0.0092)

(0.0141)

(0.0088)

(0.0179)

0.7758***

0.7294***

0.7628***

0.7120***

(0.0140)

(0.0177)

(0.0112)

(0.0349)

1.0030

0.9677***

1.0269***

0.9685***

(0.0021)

(0.0026)

(0.0027)

(0.0043)

1.0000

1.0001***

1.0000

1.0003***

(0.00002)

(0.00003)

(0.00003)

(0.00005)

Female

0.8960***

0.9966

0.9846

0.9729**

(0.0069)

(0.0100)

(0.0098)

(0.0112)

Black

0.7693***

0.3647***

0.7125***

0.6345***

(0.0109)

(0.0104)

(0.0105)

(0.0187)

0.9209***

0.7407***

0.6572***

0.6727***

(0.0119)

(0.0240)

(0.0150)

(0.0236)

0.9757

0.4941***

0.5461***

0.7322***

Age at Listing

Age at Listing squared

Hispanic
Asian

(0.0212)

(0.0175)

(0.0136)

(0.0298)

0.8012***

0.5826***

0.7058***

0.6953***

(0.0217)

(0.0273)

(0.0254)

(0.0354)

College Education

1.0476***

1.3736***

0.9573***

1.0220

(0.0111)

(0.0200)

(0.0104)

(0.0211)

Diabetes

0.8251***

0.7429***

1.9486***

1.7656***

(0.0099)

(0.0163)

(0.0268)

(0.0675)

Hypertension

0.9576**

1.0477**

0.9293***

0.9188***

(0.0175)

(0.0214)

(0.0176)

(0.0298)

COPD

0.9095***

0.8426***

1.4930***

1.0041

(0.0335)

(0.0438)

(0.0479)

(0.0602)

0.9628***

0.5680***

1.2138***

0.9692

(0.0109)

(0.0083)

(0.0127)

(0.0210)

1.0051

0.9800

0.9234

1.5717***

(0.9628)

(0.0472)

(0.0547)

(0.2346)

150,782

53,909

61,858

33,579

Other Ethnicity Category

Medicare

CMS Final Rule

Number of Exits
Total Number of Spells
Average Probability of Exit (per day)‡

376,982

376,982

376,982

376,982

5.53x10‐2%

1.98x10‐2%

2.27x10‐2%

1.23x10‐2%

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional covariates include blood type (A, B, AB, with O being the reference category), an indicator for highly sensitized patients, medical priority and functional status at listing. Coefficients
on these covariates are available upon request. ‡The average probability of exit is calculated as the number of exits divided by the product of number of spells and the average spell length.
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Antigens, beside blood type and other biological characteristics, are a very important part in the matching
process for transplantation. I address the issue of statistical discrimination by estimating equation (1) with
additional controls for antigens (e.g. antigens A30, B53, DR11, DR13, and DR15) that are more prevalent
in the African‐American population. Results in Table A1 show that the probability of transitioning via
transplantation decreases for candidates carrying the majority of these antigens. Nonetheless, there is
still some unexplained disparity in the probability of getting transplantation between Whites and Blacks—
the hazard ratio increased for Black from 0.7693 to 0.7863 for deceased donor transplantation—which
needs further research but this is beyond the scope of this research.
College education also increases the propensity of transplantation and reduces that of death on the
waiting list. For instance, college education increases the hazard for a living donor transplantation by
35.19% over the baseline hazard (Table 3). This reinforces results from earlier literature on the positive
effect of education on health (Farrell and Fuchs, 1982; Kenkel, 1991; Lleras‐Muney, 2005; de Walque,
2007; Atlas and Skinner, 2009). Since education attainment is used as a measure of socio‐economic status
because of its influence on income (Mincer, 1974; Farrell and Fuchs, 1982; Farber and Gibbons, 1996;
Fuchs, 2004; Lleras‐Muney, 2005), my results are indicative that relatively well‐to‐do individuals, seeking
transplantation, are more prone to having a living donor. Medicare insurance, another indicator for socio‐
economic status, significantly decreases the likelihood of living donor transplantation by 43.2% over the
baseline hazard and increases the hazard of death by 21.38% over the corresponding baseline hazard.
One can conclude that there is a positive relationship between prospects of transplantation and socio‐
economic status.
More stringent rules for performance evaluation as defined by the CMS regulation have a negative but
statistically insignificant impact on the prospect of transplantation, ceteris paribus. The effect of the
regulation is more pronounced on the likelihood of de‐listings for causes other than death and
transplantation with a significant increase in the propensity by 57.17% over the baseline hazard. In the
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midst of these new regulatory constraints on performance, transplant programs may have become more
conservative in providing surgical treatments to ESRD patients, especially to risky patients (e.g. the obese).
The previous analysis examined the effect of different BMI‐classification assignments at listing on waiting
list outcomes. Statistical significance of my estimates demonstrates a substantially negative influence of
obesity, directly through BMI classification and indirectly through obesity‐related comorbidities, on the
likelihood of transplantation for ESRD patients. One important explanation for this result is the explicit
BMI threshold imposed by many transplant programs, limiting access to both listing and transplantation
especially for severely and morbidly obese patients. Weight loss attempts are most of the time
unsuccessful. One reason for failure to lose weight, beside the disutility associated it, is the lack of salient
and immediate benefits from weight loss. The psychology literature also presents short‐sightedness as
another reason for failure in dieting and weight loss. Individuals might as well find it difficult to forecast
future utility from choices made in the present (Kahneman, 2003). In the next section, I investigate
effectiveness of a weight‐loss intervention characterized by an eligibility requirement based on BMI
classification of transplant candidates. Here, the prospect of transplantation adds saliency to the benefits
of weight loss.
V.

The Effectiveness of the BMI Threshold Policy

1.

Empirical Strategy

Many transplant programs use BMI requirements as a weight‐loss intervention with the objective to
ensure better survival rates and post‐transplant outcomes. Due to sample restrictions, the effect of the
intervention can only be evaluated for candidates already registered on the DDWL. Although there is a
possibility for behavior change prior to registration, the current data does not allow an investigation of
candidates’ behavior before they are registered on the waiting list.

25

Another challenge for using this data is that participation into a weight loss program and registration at a
particular center are voluntary: patients are not randomly assigned to centers but are referred by their
nephrologist or through self‐referral. There is selection by patients. Therefore, results might suffer from
self‐selection bias and the degree of bias is unknown.30 This limitation presents a problem of external
validity of the results but does not impede internal validity because many weight loss programs are
optional, making my findings most relevant for ESRD patients who “volunteer” into such programs.
Weight change for transplant candidates, the main outcome of interest, is measured in two different
ways: the continuous difference between BMI at listing and at transplants and an indicator variable for
success in weight loss between listing and transplant.31 Wait time to transplantation determines the
intervention span. The weight change variables allow measurement of weight loss for transplant
recipients, although there is no information on the exact time when weight loss occurs. Using the change
in BMI as a dependent variable, a registration adjusted difference‐in‐difference (DD) model, following
Card and Krueger (1994), is estimated. This definition of the outcome variable further controls for time
invariant unobservable characteristics of the individual. The underlying regression model is specified as
follows:
(2)
The subscript indicates the deceased donor transplant recipient registered at transplant center in year
. The treatment variable is denoted by

, an indicator variable for individuals registered

at a center with a BMI requirement for transplantation. is a vector of individual characteristics that could
affect weight loss including gender, age, education attainment, medical condition at listing, primary

30

The degree of bias due to self‐selection is expected not to be substantial because centers that do not have an explicit BMI
requirement still examine candidates on a case by case basis with the obese still subject to implicit BMI requirements. In a
regression not displayed here, I estimated the effect of implementing an explicit BMI threshold on the number of registrations.
Sorting of patients across centers does not seem to be significantly affected by the different BMI policies implemented.
31 The before‐intervention is defined as the registration period and the after‐intervention is the time of transplantation.
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insurance used, medical urgency and functional status at listing for the patient and an indicator variable
for the CMS transplant regulation. The vector

includes controls for Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other

Ethnicity with White as the omitted category. The debilitating effect of ESRD can lead to weight loss as a
consequence. Nonetheless, controlling for these individual characteristics and clinical information at
listing can help single out the effect of individual motivation in losing weight. Age now enters the model
as an indicator variable that equals one if the patient is more than 65 years of age to account for the
difficulty in losing weight through dieting and exercising for example as one ages. I further control for
listing year effects and center fixed effects. Change in BMI is only observed in the data for transplant
recipients. Hence, transplant status becomes a censoring indicator in the selection model. Consequently,
change in BMI for patient , registered at center in year , is observed if:
0, the selection equation

_

(3)

The Heckman selection model assumes that the error terms from equations (2) and (3) come from a
,

bivariate normal distribution with correlation

. If

0, coefficient estimates

using standard regression methods would suffer from sample selection bias (Wooldridge, 2010). The
Heckman model with a two‐step estimator accounts for this and produces consistent and asymptotically
efficient coefficient estimates. Identification of the sample selection model relies on explanatory variables
that enter into the selection equation but are not included in the main regression equation. These
covariates include additional variables influencing the likelihood of transplantation: blood type and a
dummy for highly sensitized status which presumably have no effect of an individual’s ability to lose
weight.
The estimation steps of the Heckman selection model consist in first estimating a probit model for the
selection equation (equation (3)) using the entire sample of transplant candidates registered between
1990 and 2010. The comprehensive sample comprises individuals on the active waiting list, those who
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received a transplant (both from deceased donors and living donors), and patients who have been
removed from the waiting list for causes of death and all other causes: a total of 294,864 registrations.
) is then estimated from equation (3) and added as an

The inverse mills ratio, a function of (

additional covariate in the main regression equation (equation (2)). The resulting augmented regression
model is estimated using the restricted sample of deceased donor transplant recipients. A statistically
significant estimate of the inverse mills ratio provides evidence for a sample selection bias if the model
does not control for sample selection.
Since the weight‐loss intervention restricts access to transplantation for severe and morbid obesity (the
affected population), the model in equation (2) is further extended into a regression‐adjusted difference‐
in‐difference‐in‐difference (DDD) model. The interaction term, equal to 1 for the severely and morbidly
obese whose BMI is above the specified threshold, represents candidates for whom the threshold for
transplantation is binding at listing. The empirical model estimated is now defined as follows:
&
&

(4)

Here the intervention effect, measuring responsiveness of the affected population to the incentive of
transplantation, is given by the coefficient on the interaction term

. A similar selection equation to

equation (3), accounting for BMI classification into severe and morbid obesity, is used for the regression‐
adjusted DDD model. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Although there is no information on patient behavior after de‐listing, the effect of the intervention on
graft failure will provide some insights on the relationship between weight loss and improved quality of
life and also with longevity post transplantation. Graft failure is a function of many factors including
obesity as a pertinent cause because of the negative influence of obesity on organ functioning.
Expectations are that an effective policy will also have a negative effect on graft failure rates. The
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regression estimated using a linear probability model for graft failure within the first year or within the
first three years after transplantation is defined below:

&
&
&

(5)
In this regression, the effect of the intervention is allowed to vary with weight loss measured by the
indicator variable.
2.

Estimation results

Results for the regression‐adjusted DD for determinants of weight loss are presented in Table 4. It is
important to note that although some patients shed some of their excess weight, a few individuals do gain
weight between listing and transplantation. Consequently, the change in BMI between listing and
transplantation can be positive or negative. One should also keep in mind, when interpreting the results,
that a particular variable stimulating weight loss will have a negative coefficient in the regression with the
continuous change in BMI as the outcome variable. However, this variable would have a positive marginal
effect on the weight loss indicator variable. The opposite is also true for variables that stimulate weight
gain between listing and transplantation. In general, the effects of all covariates are consistent across the
two specifications.
Controlling for severity of the disease on the patient’s overall health condition, the intervention has a
positive and significant effect on weight loss. Deceased donor recipients registered at treated centers are
about 16.1 percentage points more likely to lose weight between registration and transplantation. This
translates into an average decrease in BMI of 1.24 Kg/m2 over the duration on waiting list for patients
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Table 4: Determinants of weight loss (Deceased Donor Transplant Recipients)‐Regression Adjusted DD
with Sample Selection Correction
(1)
Change in BMI
(Continuous)

(2)
Weight Loss
(Indicator)

‐1.2362***
(0.350)
0.0333**
(0.017)
‐0.0024
(0.036)
0.2662***
(0.021)
0.0245
(0.026)
0.1335***
(0.037)
0.1492***
(0.051)
‐0.0860
(0.074)
‐0.0304
(0.024)
0.1851***
(0.033)
‐0.1012***
(0.033)
0.1695
(0.111)
0.7540***
(0.125)
0.1481***
(0.023)
0.0958
(0.102)

0.1614***
(0.050)
‐0.0037
(0.002)
0.0053
(0.005)
‐0.0327***
(0.003)
‐0.0008
(0.004)
‐0.0216***
(0.005)
‐0.0248***
(0.007)
0.0045
(0.011)
‐0.0016
(0.003)
‐0.0237***
(0.005)
0.0135***
(0.005)
‐0.0267*
(0.016)
‐0.0740***
(0.018)
‐0.0163***
(0.003)
‐0.0186
(0.015)

Inverse Mills Ratio ( )

‐0.1827**
(0.090)

‐0.0139
(0.013)

Observations
Wald

122,683
1,712.72

122,683
1,830.20

VARIABLES

BMI Threshold
Log Wait Time
Age (=1 if age at listing ≥65)
Female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Ethnicity Category
College Education
Diabetes
Hypertension
COPD
(Pre‐Registration) Dialysis Treatment
Medicare
CMS Final Rule

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Heteroskedaticity‐robust standard errors are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional covariates include
medical priority and functional status at listing. Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.

30

registered at centers with a BMI requirement. These results are significant given that the sample includes
individuals in healthier BMI categories who more likely gained weight during their wait time. Findings are
also consistent with the “Law of Behavior,” stating that higher incentives (i.e. the lifesaving treatment of
transplantation) stimulate more effort and higher performance (Gneezy et al. 2011); and have important
economic implications. Researchers have shown in past studies that depending on age, gender, and initial
BMI, modest weight loss (10% of BMI) would (1) reduce the expected number of years of life with chronic
diseases such as hypertension and type II diabetes (the 2 leading causes of ESRD) by 1.2 to 2.9 and 0.5 to
1.7, respectively; (2) reduce incidence of coronary heart disease and stroke; (3) increase life expectancy
by 2 to 7 months; and (4) reduce expected lifetime medical care real cost of hypertension, type II diabetes,
coronary heart disease, stroke, and hypercholesterolemia by $1,402.17 to $3,377.95 per person (Oster et
al., 1999).32 In another economic evaluation of weight‐loss interventions, the cost effectiveness in real US
dollars of a 3‐component intervention of diet, exercise, and behavior modification for overweight and
obese women was estimated at $7,114.62 per quality‐adjusted life year gained compared with routine
care (Roux et al., 2006).33 These findings also validate the use of (financial and non‐financial) incentives to
help slow down the obesity epidemic.
Table 5 presents results for the regression adjusted DDD where the interest is on the response of the
severely and morbidly obese given by

in equation (4). After correcting for sample selection bias, I find

that individuals with BMI greater than 35 Kg/m2 also respond to the incentive of transplantation with an
increase in the likelihood of weight loss by about 6.4 percentage points (Table 5, Column 2). The average
weight loss registered for this group is 1.55 Kg/m2. Due to health complications associated with long‐term
dialysis (i.e. bone disease, high blood pressure, anemia, nerve damage, heart disease, and infection (Beth
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The nominal estimates ranged from $2,200 to $5,300 in 1996 U.S. dollars. The 1996 CPI index, used for calculation, is 156.9
(BLS, 2013).
33 The estimated cost‐effectiveness in 2001 U.S. dollars is $12,600 and the 2001 CPI index is 177.1 (BLS, 2013).
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Table 5: Determinants of weight loss (Deceased Donor Transplant Recipients)‐Regression Adjusted DDD
with Sample Selection Correction
VARIABLES

BMI Threshold
Severely and Morbidly Obese at Listing
BMI at Listing above Threshold for the Severely and Morbidly
Obese
Log Wait Time
Age (=1 if age at listing ≥65)
Female
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other Ethnicity Category
College Education
Diabetes
Hypertension
COPD
(Pre‐Registration) Dialysis Treatment
Medicare
CMS Final Rule

Inverse Mills Ratio ( )

Observations
Wald

(1)
Change in BMI
(Continuous)

(2)
Weight Loss
(Indicator)

‐1.0910***
(0.341)
‐2.2448***
(0.049)
‐1.5479***

0.1544***
(0.050)
0.1617***
(0.007)
0.0637***

(0.073)
0.0591***
(0.016)
‐0.1271***
(0.035)
0.3583***
(0.020)
0.0817***
(0.025)
0.0910**
(0.036)
‐0.0289
(0.050)
‐0.1107
(0.072)
‐0.0097
(0.023)
0.3076***
(0.032)
‐0.1054***
(0.032)
0.2270**
(0.108)
0.7168***
(0.122)
0.1227***
(0.023)
0.0147
(0.100)

(0.011)
‐0.0058**
(0.002)
0.0131***
(0.005)
‐0.0387***
(0.003)
‐0.0045
(0.004)
‐0.0187***
(0.005)
‐0.0129*
(0.007)
0.0061
(0.011)
‐0.0029
(0.003)
‐0.0325***
(0.005)
0.0138***
(0.005)
‐0.0305*
(0.016)
‐0.0722***
(0.018)
‐0.0148***
(0.003)
‐0.0140
(0.015)

‐0.2125**
(0.087)

0.0187
(0.013)

122,683
8511.41

122,683
3,118.64

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Heteroskedaticity‐robust standard errors are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Additional covariates include medical
priority and functional status at listing. Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.
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Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 2013)), the survival rates after transplantation may more likely increase
with shorter wait times also induced by weight loss.
Turning to intermediate and long term effects of the intervention, I evaluate the influence of the BMI
criteria on the likelihood of graft failure (Table 6).34 The effect of the intervention is allowed to vary with
patients’ success in losing and maintaining the lost weight and with BMI classification into severe and
morbid obesity for whom the thresholds are binding. The corresponding marginal effects imply a positive
and significant impact on post‐transplant outcomes. Severely and morbidly obese patients who lose
weight at centers with a BMI threshold are, ceteris paribus, about 3.5 percentage points less likely to
experience graft failure within the first year. The magnitude remains stable over time. The estimated
effects are relatively important considering that about 8% of organs transplanted fail on average within
one year and 12% fail within three years post transplantation for severely and morbidly obese patients.
These results are consistent with the objectives to maximize outcomes and increase patient and organ
transplant survival. Nonetheless, as I do not observe individual behavior after transplantation, current
findings on graft failure could have been attenuated if the individual reverted to old habits leading to
weight gain after transplantation. In their discussion on the interactions between extrinsic incentives and
intrinsic motivations, Gneezy et al. (2011) state that while some incentives might have the desired effect
in the short run, once they are removed, individuals might be less eager to pursue the desired outcome
(i.e. weight loss). In light of economic and health benefits associated with weight loss of the obese in
general, my results provide additional insights on ways to improve the already complex (cadaveric) organ
allocation process and maximize the added quality‐adjusted life years with transplantation.
Beside BMI, the generous amount of information in the data allows the investigation of how

34

For this estimation, 24,562 registrations information are dropped from the sample because these transplant recipients have
died during the follow up period.
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Table 6: Effect of the BMI Requirement on Graft Failure ‐Deceased Donor Transplant Recipients
VARIABLES
BMI Threshold
Weight Loss
Weight Loss * S & M Obese
(BMI > Threshold) for the S & M Obese
Weight Loss *BMI Threshold
Weight Loss * (BMI > Threshold) for the S & M Obese
Log Wait Time
Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing
Age≥65
Female
Black

(1)

(2)

Graft Failure within 1 year

Graft Failure within 3 years

‐0.0277***
(0.002)

‐0.0017
(0.004)

‐0.0060*

‐0.0045

(0.003)

(0.004)

0.0013

‐0.0032

(0.009)

(0.010)

0.0367***

0.0330**

(0.011)

(0.013)

0.0044

0.0026

(0.004)

(0.005)

‐0.0347***

‐0.0349**

(0.013)

(0.016)

‐0.0017***

‐0.0067***

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.0086

0.0165**

(0.006)

(0.008)

0.0027

‐0.0027

(0.003)

(0.004)

0.0005

‐0.0020

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.0125***

0.0533***

(0.002)

(0.003)

Hispanic

‐0.0121***

‐0.0085***

(0.002)

(0.003)

Asian

‐0.0148***

‐0.0151***

(0.003)

(0.004)

‐0.0032

0.0063

Other Ethnicity Category
College Education
Diabetes
Hypertension
COPD
(Pre‐Registration) Dialysis Treatment

(0.006)

(0.007)

0.0007

‐0.0025

(0.002)

(0.002)

‐0.0032**

‐0.0122***

(0.001)

(0.002)

‐0.0095***

‐0.0108***

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.0018

0.0061

(0.008)

(0.010)

0.0047

0.0189*

(0.008)

(0.010)

0.0096***

0.0159***

(0.002)

(0.002)

‐0.0152*

‐0.0236***

(0.008)

(0.008)

Observations

98,115

98,115

R‐squared

0.029

0.050

Medicare
CMS Final Rule

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional covariates include medical priority and functional status at listing. Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.
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and Blacks, two ethnicities with a high prevalence of obesity, have a relatively lower probability of
experiencing weight loss (Tables 5). The marginal effect of Hispanic remains statistically significant when
using both measures of weight loss. Results from the regression adjusted DDD imply that for Hispanic
patients the probability of experiencing weight loss decreases by about 1.9 percentage points relative to
White patients. Additional findings on post‐transplant outcomes indicate however that all else constant,
Hispanic candidates fare well post transplantation compared to White transplant recipients with a
decrease in the likelihood of graft failure within the first year by about 1.2 percentage points. The
estimated superior transplant outcome for Hispanics validates the “Hispanic paradox” reported in earlier
studies, which documented higher rates of graft survival for this group (Gordon and Caicedo, 2009; USRDS,
2007).
In Table 5, estimates on gender also confirm that weight loss remains a challenge for females relative to
male transplant recipients. Regression estimates also suggest that college education does not significantly
affect post‐transplant outcomes. Although the coefficients are not statistically different from zero
findings, the effect of higher education could be more noticeable in the long run.
1. Heterogeneity and Sensitivity Analysis
One major assumption in the previous analysis is one of no change in centers’ BMI requirements over
time. However, with changes in the regulatory environment and advancements in medical technology,
centers could have revised their BMI threshold policy.35 I used the data to verify accuracy of the
information obtained after calling transplant centers. For each center, I plotted the distribution of the
maximum patient’s BMI listed between 1990 and 2010. A variable was created to indicate if the BMI

35

Transplant programs could sometimes be inclined to relax their requirements for listing and/or transplantation, giving greater
access to the obese. Flexibility is also favored by the advances in medicine and medical technology overtime. The CMS recent
Final Rule, introducing more accountability for centers’ performance, could nonetheless explain more stringent eligibility criteria
for transplantation over the years.
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Table 7: Determinants of weight loss (Deceased Donor Transplant Recipients)‐Heterogeneity Effect
across BMI Distribution
VARIABLES
BMI Threshold
Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing
BMI above Threshold (by 0‐4 kg/m2 ) for the S &M Obese
BMI above Threshold (by 4‐8 kg/m2) for the S &M Obese
BMI above Threshold (by 8‐12 kg/m2) for the S &M Obese
BMI above Threshold (>12 kg/m2) for the S &M Obese

Inverse Mills Ratio ( )

Observations
Wald

(1)

(2)

Change in BMI (Continuous)

Weight Loss (Indicator)

‐1.0914***

0.1546***

(0.334)
‐2.2393***
(0.048)
0.0235
(0.029)
‐1.6150***

(0.050)
0.1616***
(0.007)
0.0262**
(0.012)
0.1010***

(0.126)
‐6.3059***
(0.198)
‐16.3574***
(0.246)

(0.019)
0.1462***
(0.029)
0.3123***
(0.037)

‐0.2140**

0.0192

(0.086)

(0.013)

122,683
13,863.23

122,683
3,198.02

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Heteroskedaticity‐robust standard errors are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The same set of covariates
used in Tables 4 & 5 is included in these regressions. Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.

threshold was enforced throughout the study period. Results (in a regression not reported) were robust
to the new specification.
As mentioned earlier, there is no uniformity in the BMI thresholds imposed by transplant centers.
Information on exact BMI threshold collected from phone calls allows me to examine the degree of the
treatment effect on patients at different points in the BMI distribution. One could argue that people with
BMI close in distance to the explicit threshold would be more motivated in losing the excess weight.
Regression results in Table 7 test this hypothesis and suggest that instead there is a positive relationship
between the distance from patients’ BMI to the center’s threshold and the probability of weight loss.
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Due to the relatively uncommon change in BMI threshold over time and the unlikely removal of a
threshold once it is instated, the timing of the initial BMI threshold seems more important than a change
in BMI requirement over the years. Although no exact information was obtained on the date of the initial
BMI threshold at treated centers, information on the national trend in obesity could be used as a
reference. Based on the relevant literature, there was a statistically significant increase in the prevalence
of obesity in the country between 1976‐1980 and 1988‐1994 and again between 1988‐1994 and 1999‐
2000 (Flegal et al. 2010). Data on trends of self‐reported obesity from the Centers for disease Control and
Prevention suggest an increase in prevalence of adult obesity between 1988‐1994 and 2007‐2008 at all
income and education levels (CDC, 2013). Obesity has been recognized as a major public health challenge
and a national health threat over the past decade. Further data in 2007‐2008 suggested that
approximately 72.5 million adults in the United States were considered obese (CDC, 2010a & 2010b).
Further restricting the time period of analysis to registrations between 2000 and 2010 to account for the
surge in effort and interventions to halt obesity and its associated side‐effects, the Heckman selection
models for equations (2) and (4) are re‐estimated for transplant recipients with the indicator for weight
loss as the outcome variable. I used the indicator for explicit BMI policies as the treatment variable.
The resulting coefficients estimates in Table 8 validate earlier findings and the effect of interest in
equation (3),

, for cadaveric donor transplant recipients remains significant: a 5.2 percentage point

increase in the probability of weight loss for the severely and morbidly obese. The intervention effect on
severely and morbidly obese deceased donor transplant recipients is robust to changes in the period of
analysis.
Assuming that the BMI requirement is more binding for cadaveric organ transplantation, there should not
be any significant effect of the intervention on the group of living donor transplant recipients who, in most
cases, do not experience the same uncertainty in wait time to transplantation. Estimation results in the
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Table 8: Probability of Weight Loss (Indicator) 2000‐2010 with Sample Selection Correction
Deceased Donor Transplant
Recipients
VARIABLES

Living Donor Transplant
Recipients

DD

DDD

DD

DDD

0.0711
(0.059)

0.0732
(0.059)
0.1553***
(0.009)
0.0523***
(0.013)

‐0.0602
(0.131)

‐0.0551
(0.131)
0.1194***
(0.012)
0.0537***
(0.019)

Inverse Mills Ratio ( )

‐0.0008
(0.015)

0.0086
(0.015)

0.0243
(0.018)

0.0252
(0.017)

Observations
Wald

69,261
1,457.85

69,261
2,214.59

36,090
775.04

36,090
1,021.13

BMI Threshold
Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing
(BMI > Threshold) for the Severely and Morbidly Obese

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Heteroskedaticity‐robust standard errors are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The same set of covariates used
in Tables 4 & 5 is included in these regressions. Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.

last two columns of Table 8 suggest negative but statistically insignificant effect of the intervention on
probability of weight loss for live donor transplant recipients (column 3), in general, registered between
2000 and 2010. However, the effect on severely and morbidly obese living donor transplant recipients is
similar in magnitude and significance to the policy impact estimated on their counterparts receiving
cadaveric organs. Nonetheless, this estimated effect does not invalidate the identified mechanism for
cadaveric donor transplant. It suggests that there are multiple mechanisms—including priority in
general—through which the intervention operates, especially for obese patients. Besides the policy to
encourage weight loss before surgery for obese patients, the recent changes in the regulatory
environment introducing more accountability for performance of transplant programs could also justify
such results. With the prospect of being flagged for poor performance and the sanction of losing Medicare
coverage, centers are becoming very cautious and may be raising the standards for all transplant
candidates but more so for patients receiving kidneys from deceased donors: the difficulty and complexity
of organ allocation arises mainly with cadaveric donor kidneys.
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Table 9: Probability of Weight Loss (Indicator) 2000‐2010: Test for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Sample Selection Correction
Gender
VARIABLES
BMI Threshold
Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing
BMI > Threshold for the Severely and Morbidly Obese

Inverse Mills Ratio ( )

Observations
Wald 2

White
DDD

Race
Black
DDD

Male
DDD

Female
DDD

Hispanic
DDD

0.1578**
(0.079)
0.1427***
(0.012)
0.0678***
(0.018)

‐0.0367
(0.087)
0.1709***
(0.013)
0.0351*
(0.019)

0.0040
(0.019)

0.0216
(0.024)

‐0.0044
(0.023)

0.0147
(0.026)

‐0.0137
(0.041)

42,130
1,382.47

27,131
1,128.53

34,817
1,219.02

20,185
885.51

9,242
558.30

‐0.0081
0.2808**
‐0.3081
(0.086)
(0.111)
(0.294)
0.1536*** 0.1407*** 0.1889***
(0.012)
(0.015)
(0.027)
0.0491*** 0.0594***
0.0610
(0.018)
(0.022)
(0.041)

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Heteroskedaticity‐robust standard errors are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The same set of covariates used in Tables 4 & 5 is included in these regressions. Coefficients on these covariates are
available upon request.
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Considering the sample used in regressions from Table 8 heterogeneity in treatment effect on the severely
and morbidly obese is finally examined, distinguishing between gender and race ethnicity (Table 9). Earlier
results appear to be mainly driven by response to the incentive of transplantation from males, Black and
White patients in the highest BMI classification at listing.
VI.

Discussion

The direct and indirect economic costs of obesity are estimated to exceed $190 billion per year (Cawley
and Meyerhoefer, 2012). It is therefore important to evaluate effectiveness of programs aimed at slowing
down this epidemic. Such evaluations will inform policy makers on what programs work and what
programs do not work so as to avoid waste of resources and money. In this chapter, I investigate the
relationship between obesity and transplantation and evaluate effectiveness of a weight‐loss intervention
on the population of kidney transplant candidates. In analyzing the influence of obesity on the likelihood
of transplantation, results indicate that there is a penalty associated with obesity. Obese patients
experience a decrease in the hazard of about 3.14% to 6.53% over the baseline hazards for deceased
donor transplant and living donor transplant, respectively. The penalty is significantly higher for severe
and morbid obesity with a decrease in the hazard of 22.42% over the baseline hazard for deceased donor
transplants and 27.06% over the baseline hazard for living donor transplants. The BMI thresholds for
transplantation enforced at many centers most likely explain the disparities between obese and severely
and morbidly obese patients. Such requirements are intended to encourage weight loss in the ESRD
population seeking transplantation and potentially maximize post‐transplant outcomes. While the
differences between ethnicities remain unexplained without further research, results suggest that socio‐
economic status is also a major determinant in the prospect of transplantation. Furthermore, the
likelihood of transplantation decreases with more accountability introduced by the CMS regulation on
transplantation.
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This analysis further contributes to the literature by measuring the effectiveness of a weight loss program
with the highest incentive possible, life (with transplantation). Although, changes in patient’s BMI cannot
be tracked between listing and transplantation, a strength of this study resides in the fact that transplant
recipients are observed for a relatively long time—the average wait time is about 2 years for deceased
donor transplantation—which allows assessment of success in weight loss. After correcting for sample
selection bias, the intervention clearly stimulates weight loss for cadaveric donor transplant recipients in
general: the probability of weight loss increases by about 16.1 percentage points. The estimated 1.24
Kg/m2 average weight loss for transplant recipients (including individuals in healthier BMI categories) at
treated centers is relatively higher than modest to no weight loss estimated in previous studies (Volpp et
al., 2008; Cawley and Price, 2013). Severely and morbidly obese candidates are also responsive to such
BMI policies. Moreover, findings are robust to a more conservative sample. Distinguishing between
gender and race ethnicity, males, Black and White patients are found to drive the estimated intervention
effects on severely and morbidly obese patients. The intervention has positive and sustained effects on
post‐transplant health outcomes for severely and morbidly obese transplant candidates who do lose
weight between registration and transplantation.
Long‐term weight loss and maintenance remain a challenge for weight loss programs in general.
Nonetheless, the relatively large magnitudes of weight loss estimated in this analysis confirm that obesity
is a reversible risk factor and the amount of effort is commensurate with the value of the trade‐offs and
incentives offered. Results from previous studies on weight‐loss interventions with financial incentives
also suggest that participants regain much of the weight lost once incentives are removed (Volpp et al.,
2008; John et al., 2011; John et al., 2012). Notwithstanding the lack of information on changes in patient’s
behavior and BMI after transplantation, the weight‐loss intervention instated by many transplant
programs might also suffer from this same challenge. Considering transplantation as an important
objective of this intervention, one can infer that the weight‐loss intervention is successful in getting
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deceased donor transplant recipients to respond to the incentive. In fact, the cost effectiveness per life‐
year of renal transplantation on ESRD patients was valued in real dollars at about $11,765 (Tengs et al.,
1995).36 Long‐term goals of better graft and patient survival following transplantation are further attained
for the target population in the highest BMI category at listing. For these reasons, centers not currently
enforcing an explicit BMI eligibility criterion for transplantation might consider doing so to maximize
outcomes of the obese. This is especially true with the new kidney allocation policies, in effect as of
December 4, 2014. According to the New Kidney Allocation System, allocation of the healthiest kidneys
will be made to patients with higher expected survival rates (OPTN, 2014b).
This study offers another perspective in evaluating effectiveness of programs offering incentives for
weight loss. With the important intervention effects (i.e. actual weight loss) registered in this research,
policy makers should realize that altering individuals’ trade‐offs in order to generate salient incentives is
essential in developing strategies and policies to reverse the obesity epidemic. However, non‐random
assignment to treatment with the voluntary nature of referral to transplant centers is a limitation for
generalizing these results. Nonetheless, there is so little known about effectiveness of weight‐loss
interventions in general and for the ESRD population and transplant candidates in particular—where
obesity is highly prevalent—that internal validity of this study is a non‐negligible contribution for future
policy design. Moreover, the lack of evidence of weight‐loss methods effectiveness overall has led the
Institute of Medicine to state that “all types of evaluation can make an important contribution to the
evidence based upon which to design policies, programs, and interventions” (Institute of Medicine, 2007,
p.4).

36

The nominal estimate is $17,000 per life‐year in 1993 U.S. dollars. The real estimate is calculated using the average annual
consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI1993=144.5) with 1982‐84 as the base year, published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS, 2013).
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Another shortcoming of this study due to data restrictions is that the policy impact on attrition associated
with weight loss cannot be investigated. Attrition is very important in assessing the effect of weight‐loss
programs because it provides valuable information on individual effort by comparing the number of
enrollments to that of individuals who completed the program. Some of the transplant candidates, who
were BMI ineligible for transplantation including candidates still waiting at the end of the study period or
those removed for causes other than transplantation, might have contributed to attrition. In terms of
future research conditional of data availability on all transplant candidates, one could examine to what
extent these external incentives affect patient intrinsic incentives. Such an analysis will be important
especially for individuals who attrite, those who fail to lose weight, or who are unable to maintain the lost
weight after registration.
Since transplant recipients are censored after transplantation, one cannot fully explore weight regain,
which is very common post transplantation (Lentine et al., 2012). Although findings on the intervention
effect on graft failure could provide suggestive evidence for weight regain, more information is necessary
to examine the extent of weight regain in this population. In fact, the literature on weight loss with
financial incentives provides mixed results on behavior change after incentives are terminated: some
studies provide evidence for considerable weight regain (Volpp et al., 2008; John et al., 2011; John et al.,
2012; Paloyo et al. 2013) and others confirm individual commitment to a healthy lifestyle after
termination of incentives (Royer et al., 2012; Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Unintended effects of these
BMI‐eligibility rules could also include de‐listings for causes other than transplantation and should be
investigated further.
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Chapter II: Unintended Effects of the CMS Final Rule on Transplantation: A Patient Welfare Question
As of December 2011, End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) patients receiving dialysis treatment increased to
nearly 419,200 individuals (USRDS, 2013). The resulting growth in excess demand for kidney
transplantation has generated increasing concerns in the community since about 18 individuals die every
day waiting for an organ transplant (US DHHS, 2013). Nevertheless, a recent accountability policy
introduced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services (CMS) to evaluate and monitor transplant
centers’ performance may exacerbate the shortage problem.
This research provides an attempt at estimating the effect of the CMS Final Rule on patient health
outcomes. I emphasize the specific provisions of the regulation used for performance evaluation and
assess the impact of accountability policy requirements on transplant centers’ service performance
between 2003 and 2010. I further distinguish between the effects of performance measures for graft
survival (i.e. allograft or organ transplant failure) and patient survival (i.e. patient death) post
transplantation. Using a difference‐in‐difference framework, results suggest that more accountability
creates a tradeoff between quality and access in the provision of care. For every 1 unit decrease in graft
failures, there are more than 10 less transplants conducted per 6‐month period at low‐performing centers
eligible for sanctions under the current regulation. Moreover, the estimated reduction in waiting‐list
deaths at such centers is negated by the significant decrease in patient registrations in the periods post
regulation with about 7 to 9 less registrations on average per 6‐month period.
I.

Literature Review

Several observational studies point to a negative effect of the regulation on centers’ transplants volume
(Schold et al., 2013), patients’ wait times (Schnier et al., 2014b), physician’s utilization of organs (Schnier
et al. 2014a), and the waste of organs (Sack, 2012). The intent of the CMS policies was to reduce the waste
of scarce organs and to decrease the number of graft failures and re‐transplantations. Nevertheless,
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claims were made for a considerable amount of discarded kidneys, even following enactment of the Final
Rule (Sack, 2012). Sack provided estimates that about 4,720 people died in 2011 while registered on the
deceased donor waiting list for a kidney transplant. Government data also show that in each year between
2007 and 2011, more than 2,600 kidneys were discarded after being recovered from deceased donors
(Sack, 2012).
Furthermore, Howard et al. (2009) argue that, in order to comply with the CoPs in the Final Rule, regulated
agencies (e.g. transplant centers) may take a number of actions that would penalize patients. In fact,
transplant centers can adopt more stringent eligibility criteria for waiting list admissions to the detriment
of relatively riskier patients who might otherwise benefit from transplantation. Transplant programs could
shy away from using innovative and higher risk procedures, which might negatively affect their
performance in the event of a graft failure or patient death. In addition, the requirement for public report
of organ transplantation outcomes creates disincentives for centers to provide transplant services to high
risk patients (Segev et al. 2008).37 In a more recent study, Schold et al. (2013) use program specific reports
between June 2007 and January 2010 and compare transplants outcomes across centers. They find a
negative association between the regulation and transplant outcomes regardless of initial transplants
volume. Their study also suggested that the decrease in transplants volume was more accentuated in low‐
performing transplant programs. High‐performing centers were more likely to increase the volume of
transplants from extended criteria donors (ECDs).38
Although some of these previous studies have evaluated changes in response to the CMS Final Rule vis‐a‐
vis transplants volume by examining the correlation between these variables, they have not demonstrated

37 High risk patients include patients with cardiovascular diseases and obesity. These patients are more likely to experience
complications during or after surgical procedures and are, therefore, at a relatively higher risk for graft failure or death.
38 Standard criteria donors and ECDs are terms used to differentiate between types of organ donors. ECDs are deceased donors
usually over the age of 50 years that have two of the following comorbidities: a history of high blood pressure, a creatinine—a
blood test giving an indication about kidney function—of at least 1.5, or stroke‐related death. Since these conditions affect kidney
functioning, both of the donor kidneys will be transplanted to the recipient instead of only one organ, which could otherwise be
transplanted in the case of a standard criteria donor (UC Davis, 2013). Organs from ECDs present higher risks, with a higher rate
of delayed graft function, a higher probability of acute rejection, and a shorter longevity (Metzger et al. 2003).
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a causal relationship. This analysis fills this gap by controlling for a variety of center‐specific waiting list
characteristics in a difference‐in‐difference framework to disentangle the impact of the regulation on
patient health outcomes. I also examine the regulation effect on a variety of outcomes to provide better
insights on provision of care. Since the existing literature found evidence for little or even negative effects
of regulation changes with restriction provisions on health outcomes (McKnight, 2007; Sochalski et al.,
2008; Cook et al., 2012; Cotet and Benjamin, 2013), it is important to evaluate the overall effect of the
CMS Final Rule on patients’ outcomes and the cost of the regulation change. I find that the regulation
leads to a significant decrease in transplants volume by 5 to 6 transplants per 6‐month period at low‐
performing centers. The decline in patient registrations is also substantial and ranges between 7 and 9
less registrations per period. These regulation effects on access and provision of care are attenuated by
the small decrease in organ transplant failures and waiting‐list deaths at low‐performing centers. I further
test for heterogeneous treatment effects along the distribution of transplants volume. Finally, I
demonstrate importance of center‐level heterogeneity in the identification.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section I provides information about the CMS regulation. Section II
describes the econometric framework and empirical strategies for program evaluation. The data is
described in Section III. Finally, results from my empirical analysis are presented in Section IV, followed by
a conclusion.
II.

Background on the Final Rule Policy

1.

The Rules

According to the standards for data submission, the Final Rule requires transplant centers to provide 95%
of data on all deceased donor and living donor transplants performed during the approval period (i.e. 3
years) up to 90 days after the deadline established by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
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Network (OPTN).39 Centers have very little incentive to provide inaccurate data for public report to the
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). Upon receiving data from transplant programs, the
SRTR combines them with data from other sources for comparison. It also runs numerous tests in order
to identify potential errors; therefore, increasing the accuracy of the data they report (Leppke et al. 2013).
One could be concerned that the standards for massive data submission to the OPTN, that was also in
effect prior to the CMS CoP, would impose high administrative and financial costs to transplant centers.
Nonetheless in 2006, the OPTN reduced the burden to centers by eliminating the requirement to follow
transplant recipients 2 years after organ transplant failure. They have also lessened the data entry burden
for transplant centers by reducing the number of data elements required. The CMS CoP, therefore, did
not make any additional changes on the grounds that data quality should have improved significantly with
the prior OPTN changes (CMS, 2007). The CMS CoP standards on data submission conformed to existing
policies of the OPTN to avoid additional confusion for transplant centers. In fact, any unnecessary
confusion would reduce centers’ chances to comply with the set rules. With the CMS CoPs maintaining
many of the same requirements used in existing policies for transplant centers, they should not impose
additional administrative costs for compliance.
In terms of clinical experience, transplant centers are required to perform at least 3 kidney and 10 heart,
intestine, liver and lung transplants per annum. No volume requirement is set for simultaneous heart and
lung centers and pancreas centers as well as centers specializing in pediatric transplants. The Final Rule
also defines standards for outcome measures that evaluate performance of transplant centers. Total graft
survival outcomes and total patient survival outcomes are separately considered for this evaluation. The
Rule further distinguishes between reviews of adult and pediatric outcomes based on specialty of the
center for approval of Medicare coverage.

39

Beside the data submission requirement, the OPTN does not have published bylaws and policies for transplant centers (CMS,
2007).
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Another major evaluation of transplant programs includes comparison of the risk adjusted expected 1‐
year patient survival and 1‐year graft survival outcomes and the corresponding observed outcomes
relative to three non‐compliance thresholds. The CMS would consider a transplant program’s
performance as unacceptable if its observed survival rates were lower than its expected survival rates in
addition to having 1) a difference between the number of observed events (patient deaths or graft failure)
and the number of expected events larger than 3 [

3]; 2) a ratio of the number of observed events

to the number of expected events larger than 1.5 [ /

1.5]; and 3) a one‐sided p‐value, based on an

exact Poisson test for the difference between the observed and expected events, less than 0.05 [
0.05] (CMS, 2007).
The outcome requirements aforementioned remain the most important factor used in evaluating centers'
performance. While these requirements are binding for existing and new kidney and liver transplant
centers applying for Medicare coverage approval or re‐approval, they do not apply to heart‐lung,
intestinal, and pancreas transplant centers. Prior to the regulation, all three thresholds were used by the
OPTN and the SRTR to flag centers for low performance and for additional review but no sanctions were
associated with low performance. Hence, there was no effective enforcement mechanism prior to the
regulation.
Moreover, the CMS lays out standards for patient and living donor selection and requires centers to
ensure that organs be distributed fairly and in a non‐discriminatory manner. Other important
responsibilities for transplant centers, beside informing patients for approval or denial in the program,
are to keep their waiting list up to date—especially for removals—and to inform the patient’s dialysis
center if that patient becomes a kidney candidate at their facility.
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2. Approval for Medicare and Sanctions
Approval for Medicare coverage is for a period of 3 years, after which the center’s data are subject to a
quality review for compliance with all the previously mentioned standards.40 This process ensures that
centers remain active and provide quality transplant services to patients. Centers can be flagged for non‐
compliance with the outcome requirements, incurring the sanction of potentially losing certification for
Medicare coverage, following a probation period. This is the sanction as currently designated by the CMS.
During the probation period, centers are given an opportunity to enter into a system improvement
agreement, a new quality improvement tool, with the CMS. Centers in probation have to show
documentation for improvement in performance at the end of the period to avoid loss of certification.
This penalty, Medicare decertification, has significant implications for transplant programs’ operations
given that Medicare remains the primary insurance for ESRD patients on the deceased donor waiting list
for kidney transplantation (USRDS, 2013). Nonetheless, the loss of Medicare certification does not
preclude future approval but documentation will need to be provided by the center to confirm that
changes were made to comply with the CMS requirements. Though a few low‐performing centers have
entered a system improvement agreement with strict monitoring, there is no record of a center having
lost Medicare participation.
The CMS, therefore, establishes the CoPs for transplant centers, which include (1) notification to CMS; (2)
data submission, clinical experience, and outcome requirements for initial approval/re‐approval of
transplant centers; (3) patient and living donor selection; (4) quality assessment and performance
improvement (QAPI); (5) patient and living donor rights; and (6) additional requirements for kidney

40

The CMS estimated that transplant centers seeking Medicare approval in the first year of the CMS CoP would incur 2 burden
hours that would result in $142.81 in total annual cost (CMS, 2007).
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transplant centers (CMS, 2007). Thus, the CoPs define health and safety rules that have to be met in order
to get initial approval and re‐approval for Medicare coverage by the CMS.
The reminder of the study examines the impact of centers’ response to potential Medicare participation
termination on waiting list kidney transplant patients’ health outcomes. The empirical analysis focuses on
the three non‐compliance thresholds defined by the CoP outcome requirements.
III. Methodology
I analyze the effect of transplant centers’ performance below the specified CMS standards on provision
of care. Interestingly, prior to the Final Rule, the SRTR was already using all three triggers to flag centers
for low performance. Nevertheless, there was no related consequence for poor performance comparable
to eligibility for quality review and the possibility of de‐certification for Medicare coverage. Consequently,
the empirical strategy will rely on a difference‐in‐difference framework to assess the effectiveness of the
policy reform and its welfare effect. In this context, transplant center static participation into treatment
is analyzed. The main interest is in center’s participation, the extensive margin, rather than their duration
of participation (intensive margin). Adjustments at the extensive margin are, in this respect, the primary
concern in this evaluation.
The estimated policy effect is an average effect of the treatments—low performance on total graft and
total patient survival outcomes—on affected kidney transplant centers: an average treatment effect on
the treated. To be consistent with the CMS distinction between total graft and total patient outcomes
when evaluating centers’ performance, low performance based on these two outcome measures will be
considered as two different treatments in the analysis.
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The regression model for this design is given by:

Where

(1)

,

,

is the outcome variable (e.g. transplants volume, volume of ECD transplants, number of graft

failures, number of waiting‐list deaths, number of de‐listings (removals from the waiting list) for causes
other than transplantation and death, and volume of ESRD patient registrations) for center in period
. 41

is the center effect that indicates whether or not a center was

flagged for low performance upon satisfying all three non‐compliance thresholds,
1.5, and 1

3,

/

0.05 in period .42 The indicator variable

is

equal to one after the CMS Final Rule is implemented and zero in the periods prior to implementation and
represents the period effect. The variable

,

is a vector of additional observable centers’ attributes in

the previous period, including patients characteristics in center which influence the outcome variable at
and

time . The parameters

indicate the centers and the period fixed effects respectively; and

is

the error term.
The interaction between the center’s performance status and the CMS regulation is defined as an
indicator that takes the value of one for centers flagged for low performance after CMS Final Rule is
implemented. For ease of presentation, this interaction (
) is denoted

causal effect of interest,

in the remainder of the paper. The

, captures all variations in the outcome variable specific to low‐performing

centers (the treated centers) relative to centers performing at or above expectations (the control group)

41 The number of waiting‐list deaths includes individuals who are removed from the waiting list for cause of death before receiving
transplantation and those removed for being “too sick to transplant.” Waiting‐list deaths are also different from deaths registered
post transplantation (patient survival outcomes).
42
represents lagged performance of center published at the end of period
1.
Performance of centers in any given report card uses data from a 2.5 year rolling cohort of patients. For instance, a report
published at the end of period t‐1 includes patient survival and graft survival outcomes collected between periods
3 and
7.
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in periods following the regulation implementation. Identification is made through variation in low
performance status across centers and over time.
IV. Data
Two complementary datasets are used in the analysis: 1) the publicly available performance reports
published by the SRTR between December 2002 and December 2009, and 2) the United Network for Organ
Sharing Standard Transplant Analysis and Research (UNOS STAR) deceased donor waiting list patient
registrations and transplantation information for kidney transplants in the U.S. between January 1, 2003
and June 30, 2010.43,44 The SRTR reports are published biannually and provide information on 1‐year and
3‐year risk adjusted performance measures for transplant programs. Risk‐adjusted performance
measures include the number of transplants, percentage of graft/patient survival, expected graft/patient
survival, ratio of observed to expected measures for the total number of procedures, deceased donor
transplants, and living donor transplants. These measures are independent statistical assessments of how
transplant centers perform relative to the national average.
The CMS only uses the 1‐year performance measures, differentiating between graft survival and patient
survival outcomes, for monitoring and evaluating transplant center performance relative to the three non‐
compliance thresholds mentioned above. The present analysis will focus exclusively on the 1‐year total
patient and total graft survival performance variables for centers, constructed based on a 2.5‐year rolling
cohort. For example, the report published in June 2007 uses outcomes from the cohort of patients
transplanted between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2006. The treatment variables for graft survival and

43

Registrations (and all follow up information including transplantation) for simultaneous kidney and pancreas transplants were
also included. These registrations represent a very small proportion (5.04%) of total registrations.
44 Patients’ registrations with initial date recorded for placement on the waiting list between January 1, 2003 and June 30, 2010
are aggregated over 6 month periods. Due to relatively long wait times associated with the transplantation process, data were
collected on transplants and de‐listings occurring between January 1, 2003 and June 30, 2010 using data on patients’ registrations
as early as January 1986.
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patient survival are binary variables that take the value of one if all three thresholds are satisfied (
3; /

1.5; and 1‐sided

0.05) in the report of interest and zero otherwise.

UNOS STAR collects information on transplant candidates including basic demographics (gender, race, age
at listing, education attainment, and BMI at listing and at transplant (if any)) that are provided on the
registration forms at the different transplant centers. In addition, information is provided on patients’
medical conditions at listing (diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease), primary insurance, and
dates of registration and removal from the waiting list. The source of transplanted kidney is known (i.e.
living donors, deceased donors, ECDs, standard criteria donors). The particularity of the UNOS STAR
dataset is that patient registrations and follow up data provide information on 1) the demand for
transplantation (patients’ characteristics and registrations) and 2) the quality of service or supply of
transplantation provided by the center (transplants, wait times, types of donors, de‐listings, and graft
failures). 45 The two datasets were combined to allow for a time lag between the last published report and
the number of registrations and transplants conducted in the following period.
Treatment status is subject to change across periods because centers might enter into a system of
improvement agreement with the CMS to improve quality of performance and meet the established
standards later.46 The same center could, therefore, be in both control and treatment groups at different
points in time during the analysis, increasing similarity in trends between the control and the treatment
groups. The final sample includes 227 distinct centers specializing in adult transplants with at least two
reports (1‐year worth of performance measures) over fifteen 6‐month periods between 2002 and 2009

45

The transplants volume variable in this analysis aggregates transplants from both deceased donors and living donors. I created
two graft failure variables for each center based on performance review on 1‐year and 3‐year performance measures used by the
SRTR. Graft failure recorded for a transplanted patient is a binary variable that will be equal to one if it is indicated that the kidney
“graft failed” within the first year or within the first 3 years after transplantation and zero otherwise. Consequently, for any given
period these variables aggregate the number of graft failures within the first year or the first 3 years after transplantation for
transplants conducted during the time window of interest. De‐listings for causes other than transplantation, including death and
all other causes, are aggregated for the number of waiting list removals during the period of interest.
46 Based on the biannual report cards, centers can be flagged for low performance in a report and be compliant with the CMS
standards in the following report.

53

to reflect the semi‐annual SRTR report cards on transplant centers.47 A total of 268,283 patient
registrations and follow up information, including transplants conducted between 2003 and 2010 from
registrations prior to 2003 (23,370 registrations), were aggregated at the 6‐month level. The 244,913
patient registrations between January 1, 2003 and June 30, 2010 used in this analysis represent about
94.5% of total registrations additions between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2010 (OPTN, 2014a).
Due to the wait time between listing and transplantation, the 112,649 patient transplantation data in my
sample account for 81.3% of total transplants performed between January 1, 2003 and December 31,
2010.
The sample consists of 3,186 center‐period distinct observations with 1,916 observations for the pre‐CMS‐
Final‐Rule periods and 1,270 observations in the post‐regulation periods. The number of observations
varies from year to year because centers can choose to be temporarily inactive during the probation
period, for example, at different points in time. Centers can also enter the sample and commence
operations in different periods. Furthermore, transplant programs might experience some periods of
inactivity with zero registrations but still be conducting transplants on patients currently registered on
their waiting list. As a result, all patients’ characteristics in periods with no registration are given a value
of zero (55 observations or about 1.73% of the data). The converse is also true for periods with zero
transplants or de‐listings but non‐zero registrations (78 observations or about 2.45% of data). Data for all
such periods are included in the analysis. Since centers are evaluated on graft survival and patient survival
outcomes separately, the number of observations in the control and treatment groups varies across
treatment types.
I identified 73 centers (about 32% of the 227 centers) that have been flagged for low performance for
graft survival outcomes. The proportion of treated centers decreases to about 30% (69 distinct centers)

47

Each year was halved in 6‐month periods.
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for patient survival outcomes. There is a considerable overlap between the two treatments. In fact, 39
centers (about 17%) were flagged and assigned to both treatments in the same period.
1.

Trends in Proportion of Low‐performing Centers over the Years

Before proceeding to the difference‐in‐difference estimation, it is useful to examine some descriptive
evidence on the relative changes in centers satisfying all three non‐compliance thresholds for either graft
survival or patient survival outcomes, between 2002 and 2009. The Final Rule was published in the first
half of year 2007 (

9), and became effective in the second half of 2007.48 Using the biannual SRTR

reports on transplant centers, the CMS gets some basis for determining eligibility of each center for quality
review and improvement at time of (re)certification for Medicare coverage. Provided that the cycle for
re‐certification might vary across centers, each report will be used as a potential source of treatment for
each center. Figure 1 shows the distribution of low‐performing centers for both total graft and total
patient survival between 2002 and 2009. While the trend in proportion slightly increased over the years
for graft survival outcomes prior to the regulation, there was relative stability in the trends in proportion
of low‐performing centers on total patient outcomes. In the period following the implementation of the
regulation, both trends experienced a slight decrease. Nonetheless, the trend in low‐performing centers
on total grafts increased while that of low‐performing centers on total patients steadily decreased post
regulation.
Since the regulation applies to all existing and new kidney transplant programs regardless of performance,
the sample of center‐period observations with performance at or above expectations, including the subset
of centers that satisfy one or two triggers simultaneously, is used as a suitable comparison group for low‐

48 The Final Rule was published on March 30, 2007 but the effective date for the accountability policy was set to June 28, 2007. I,
therefore, assume full implementation of the regulation in the second half of 2007 (starting on July 1, 2007). The first SRTR report
that is binding for the CMS Final Rule was published in June 2007 using data from a 2 ½ rolling cohort of patients transplanted
between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2006 (between t=3 and t=7).
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performing centers. Consequently, the comparison group includes centers that have met none, exactly
one, and exactly two of the three triggers. Figure 2 shows the distribution of transplants volume, my
primary measure of patients’ welfare, over the years for both the comparison group and the treatment
group separately by treatment type. While the pre‐regulation trends are similar for total grafts survival,
there is a steady decline in the average number of transplants during the period prior to the Rule at low‐
performing centers on patient survival outcomes. The latter observed trend raises concerns for some
anticipatory effect of the regulation. I address this issue later and test for these differences in trends
between the two groups. In addition to estimating the two treatment effects on the different outcomes
of interest, I can also compare the policy effect across treatments. The large 95% confidence interval,
observed for the treated groups, is because of the relatively small number of treated units per period.
2. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 1. Registrations
increased post regulation for both treatment and comparison groups with a smaller increase at low‐
performing centers. The number of highly sensitized patients (

80) registered at transplant centers

remained relatively stable within each group across periods. Data suggests that regardless of treatment
type, there is a 2 to 1 relationship between the average number of highly sensitized patients registered
between 2003 and 2010 at centers in the comparison group versus at centers in the treatment group.
Particular interest in highly sensitized patients in the empirical analysis is consistent with centers getting
risk‐compensated for transplants conducted on this group (SRTR, 2012).
While the average volume of transplants increased in the periods post Final Rule at centers in the control
group, low‐performing centers performed relatively less transplants on average. When testing for equality
of means between treated and control groups, the difference in transplants volume post regulation is
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of depend variables for centers separated by treatment status and period (before or after the Final Rule), 2003‐2010 (N=3,186)
Controla

Before CMS Final Rule
Treated

P‐Value

Control

After CMS Final Rule
Treated

P‐Value

Subject to Quality Review: 1‐Year (Total) Graft Survival
Registrations
Registrations (Highly Sensitized
Patients)

73.18

(91.47)

43.61

(30.20)

0.0001***

84.92

(81.62)

47.63

(38.37)

0.0000***

2.69

(4.60)

1.34

(2.02)

0.0003***

2.55

(4.99)

1.42

(2.70)

0.0137**

Transplants Volume

33.89

(30.08)

25.08

(17.87)

0.0003***

37.82

(31.92)

23.02

(20.17)

0.0000***

Transplants from ECD Donor

3.77

(4.99)

2.83

(3.29)

0.0486**

4.36

(5.09)

2.45

(3.58)

0.0001***

Graft Failures (within 1 year)

1.69

(2.12)

1.59

(1.79)

0.5720

1.32

(1.68)

1.00

(1.37)

0.0398**

Graft Failures (within 3 years)

3.82

(3.62)

2.52

(3.05)

0.0015***

1.69

(2.14)

1.28

(1.79)

0.0409**

Deaths

13.46

(17.41)

9.45

(9.49)

0.0044***

16.14

(21.37)

10.57

(9.57)

0.0044***

De‐listings for all other causes

15.29

(49.07)

9.39

(10.37)

0.1331

17.83

(23.65)

15.37

(16.30)

0.2614

De‐listings Other Than Through
Transplantation

Observations

1,759

157

1,148

122

Subject to Quality Review: 1‐Year (Total) Patient Survival
Registrations
Registrations (Highly Sensitized
Patients)

72.01

(90.70)

54.55

(47.91)

0.0259**

82.67

(80.81)

64.71

(54.13)

0.0345**

2.63

(4.55)

1.97

(3.05)

0.0977*

2.46

(4.82)

2.26

(4.95)

0.6963

Transplants Volume

33.36

(29.72)

30.66

(24.42)

0.3004

36.73

(31.54)

32.19

(27.81)

0.1760

Transplants from ECD Donor
Graft Failures (within 1 year)

3.71
1.66

(4.91)
(2.07)

3.67
1.90

(4.88)
(2.36)

0.9408
0.2001

4.22
1.29

(5.04)
(1.67)

3.65
1.34

(4.32)
(1.51)

0.2868
0.7726

Graft Failures (within 3 years)

3.72

(4.90)

3.58

(4.93)

0.7514

1.65

(2.13)

1.70

(1.86)

0.08052

Deaths

13.27

(17.31)

11.43

(10.84)

0.2219

15.63

(21.08)

15.21

(13.07)

0.8486

De‐listings for all other causes

15.15

(48.80)

10.42

(11.37)

0.2577

17.45

(23.42)

19.50

(17.68)

0.4059

De‐listings Other Than Through
Transplantation

Observations

1,779

137

1,176

94

Note: All figures are per 6‐month period. The p‐values are obtained using a t‐test of equality of means. The "Treated" group represents centers flagged for low performance. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
a The Control group is constructed using the entire sample of observations from centers performing at or above expectations .
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statistically significant at the 1% level for both total grafts and total patients. The observed decrease in
transplants volume post regulation could also translate into relatively longer wait times across groups, a
relationship that has recently been examined by other researchers (Schnier et al., 2014b). Low‐performing
transplant programs perform less ECD transplants per period relative to their counterparts performing at
or above expectations.
The number of graft failures from transplants conducted in any given period reduced considerably within
each group after the regulation, especially for graft failures within the first three years after
transplantation. Considering organ transplant survival during the first three years post transplantation,
low‐performing centers on graft survival outcomes experienced a decrease in the rate of graft failures
from 10% to 6% compared with a reduction from 11% to 4% in the control group. Similar trends were
observed for performance on patient survival outcomes. This difference could be explained by a relatively
higher organ utilization rates at treated centers both prior to and after the Final Rule. In fact, transplants
at low‐performing centers represented a higher proportion of registrations at these centers between 2003
and 2010. Prior to the regulation, the transplant to registration ratio were from about 0.57 and 0.56 for
total grafts and total patients survival, respectively, at treated centers compared to a ratio of transplants
to registrations of about 0.46 at centers in the control group. After more accountability is introduced,
both groups experience a decrease in the ratio of transplants to registrations but low‐performing centers
on graft survival and patient survival respectively transplanted about 48% to 50% of all registered patients
compared with about a uniform 45% for both outcomes at centers in the control group.
Interestingly, the number of waiting‐list deaths including de‐listings for being too sick to transplant
increased from 1 to 3 additional deaths in both groups in periods following the regulation. The average
de‐listings for all other causes increased across periods within groups with a relatively larger increase over
a 6‐month period at low‐performing centers: a 64% increase from 9.4 to 15.4 average de‐listings per
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period for total grafts and a 87% increase from 10.4 to 19.5 de‐listings per period for total patient
outcomes.
V.

Empirical Results

A difference‐in‐difference framework is appealing due to its intuitive simplicity and because it can be
applied to both balanced and unbalanced panel data in addition to situations with separate cross sections
in two periods (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The case of unbalanced panel data is relevant in this analysis
due to variation in the number of centers in each time period. Besides controlling for period and center’s
fixed effects, all standard errors are clustered at the transplant center level. Clustering, therefore, allows
for an arbitrary autocorrelation process (Bertrand et al. 2004). Estimation results are presented in Tables
2a and 2b. Covariates added to these regressions are lagged values (

1) for characteristics of patients’

pool that vary across centers to account in part for the time lag associated with transplantation. I estimate
the model using a reduced sample of 2,959 observations. The set of covariates varies depending on the
outcome of interest and the list of variables comprises the number of registrations by ethnicity category,
average age for patients registered over a 6‐month period, average BMI for registered patients, number
of females, number of patients with Medicare as their primary insurance, with private insurance, with a
college education, and with particular medical conditions (i.e. highly sensitized patients, patients with
chronic diseases including diabetes and COPD). Certain specifications also included lagged values for the
number of ECD transplants and the number of graft failures within the first year post transplant.
The tables only report coefficient estimates for the policy effect (

) from the regressions. There is a

negative and significant impact on transplants volume, regardless of treatment type (Table 2a). The policy
change led to a sizeable decrease of about 5 to 6 transplants per 6‐month period for centers performing
below expectations on total patients and total grafts respectively, relative to their counterparts in the
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Table 2a: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Graft

Patient

Coeff

Coeff

‐5.7428***

‐5.1146**

(1.231)

(2.142)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.919

0.919

‐0.4313*

‐0.4658*

(0.248)

(0.274)

Outcome Variables
Transplants Volumea
Subject to Quality Review

Number of Graft Failures (within 1 year)b
Subject to Quality Review

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.508

0.505

‐0.4674

‐0.7090

(0.395)

(0.495)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.595

0.593

‐0.7566*

‐0.7912

(0.416)

(0.670)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.672

0.671

Number of Graft Failures (within 3 years)b
Subject to Quality Review

Number of Transplants from ECD Donorc
Subject to Quality Review

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. “After CMS Rule” takes the value of unity if
period
10 and 0 otherwise. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.
b Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of ECD transplants.
c Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of graft failures.
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Table 2b: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Graft

Patient

Coeff

Coeff

‐6.5607**

‐9.0331**

(2.538)

(3.936)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.834

0.834

Subject to Quality Review

0.1483

0.2803

(0.380)

(0.517)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.596

0.596

‐1.9766**

‐1.2353

(0.766)

(1.154)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.916

0.916

Subject to Quality Review

0.0096

0.4656

(2.019)

(2.865)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.401

0.401

Outcome Variables
Registrations Volumea
Subject to Quality Review

Registrations Volume‐Highly Sensitized Patientsb

Number of Deaths on the Waiting Listc
Subject to Quality Review

Number of De‐listings for all Other Causesc

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. “After CMS Rule” takes the value of unity if
period
10 and 0 otherwise. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.
b Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and number of graft failures.
c Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, and patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD).

62

comparison group.49 An implication for such results is a decrease in organ utilization rates that supports
claims of discarded organs recorded over the past few years (Sack, 2012). Since the cost effectiveness per
life‐year of renal transplantation on ESRD patients was valued in real dollars at about $11,765 (Tengs et
al., 1995), the estimated reductions in transplants volume would amount to a total of up to $141,180 that
could be saved per life‐year had centers provided these life‐saving treatments.50 These estimates
incorporate the average life expectancy gained with transplantation.51
As two of the main intents of the regulation are to increase quality of transplants and to decrease the rate
of re‐transplantation, the impacts of the Final Rule policy change on volume of graft failures within the
first year and the first three years post transplantation are also investigated. The coefficients on the policy
variable suggest a negative effect on volume of graft failures across treatments for low‐performing
centers. While these effects are desirable, only the coefficients for organ transplant failures within the
first year are statistically different from zero. Consistent with expectations on quality of transplants, the
regulation led to 0.4 to 0.5 less graft failures per period (about 1 less failure per year). One could also be
concerned about change in longevity of organ transplants over time. I examined the change in the time
to failure for organ transplanted pre and post regulation (Table A1). Findings suggest the CMS CoPs
decrease the probability of organ transplant failure at low performing centers but the effects are not
statistically different from zero.
Considering the point estimates for transplants volume and graft failure, there is roughly a 10 to 1
relationship between the regulation effects on these two outcomes. A direct implication for the decrease

49

In regressions not displayed here and available upon request, I also estimated the regulation effects with fixed treatment
groups that included centers which were identified as low‐performing on patient and graft survival in periods before the CMS
Final Rule. Results still imply significant negative effects on transplants volume but with slightly lower magnitudes.
50 The nominal estimate is $17,000 per life‐year in 1993 U.S. dollars. The real estimate is calculated using the average annual
consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI1993=144.5) with 1982‐84 as the base year, published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS, 2013). The total cost effectiveness values are also based on an average of about 10 to 12 less transplants per year
for low performing centers on patient survival and graft survival outcomes respectively.
51 While the average life expectancy for dialysis patients is estimated at 5 years, living donor kidneys are expected to function
on average between 12 to 20 years, and deceased donor kidneys 8 to 12 years (Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 2013).
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in the number of transplants at low‐performing centers eligible for a quality review from the CMS is a
decrease in ECD transplants.52 Results corroborate this assumption with a negative estimated treatment
effect: treated centers decrease the number of ECD transplants by 0.8 transplants for both total grafts
and total patients per period, as a result of more accountability.
I also document evidence for an important decline in registrations over time.53 The policy change effect is
estimated at about 7 to 9 less registrations per 6‐month period at treated centers for total grafts and total
patients, respectively (Table 2b). This reduction could be explained by a combination of two factors: 1)
patients may have become more cognizant of centers’ performance which affects sorting behavior across
centers, and 2) centers may be more selective in the type of patients registered in their program. The
literature provides mixed results on the use of information on hospital quality or quality of care on patient
market share. Some researchers have shown that patients (or referring physicians) may use information
available on hospital quality to make informed decision (Mukamel and Mushlin, 1998; Cutler et al., 2004;
Mukamel et al. 2004/2005; Dranove and Sfekas, 2008; Bundorf et al., 2009; Pope, 2009; Jung et al. 2011;
Wang et al., 2011; Werner et al., 2012). There is nonetheless another body of literature reporting minimal
use of information on hospital quality (Schneider and Epstein, 1996; Mennemeyer et al., 1997; Romano
and Zhou, 2004; Epstein, 2010). Due to the empirical nature of how patients use information on quality
of care, the effect of the CMS CoPs on patient sorting behavior is currently being investigated by the next
chapter.
The estimated decrease in registrations coupled with the continuously increasing trend in prevalence and
incidence of ESRD over the years and the regulatory environment may partly validate the idea of patient
selectivity for registration purposes. The reduction in patient registrations at low‐performing centers

52

ECD transplants represent about 11% of all transplants considered in this analysis.
Although patients are allowed to list a multiple centers, they are responsible for paying out of pocket for the extra registration
fees. The number of multiple listings for kidney transplantation varies between 5% and 10%. All multiple listings have been
removed from the sample used in this analysis.
53
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could also raise concerns for spillover effects of the regulation on programs in compliance with the CMS
standards. This means that high‐performing centers could experience a surge in registrations as a result.
Looking at these effects with a positive lens, shifting registrations and transplants to high‐performing
centers could be beneficial to patients and welfare enhancing due to relatively higher quality of care.54 To
address the question of spillovers, I re‐estimate the volume regressions with the treatment group defined
as the group of high‐performing centers (Table A2a & A2b). The control group includes the group of low‐
performing centers and non‐high‐performing centers in compliance with the CMS standards. The
estimated policy effects are positive but highly insignificant and smaller in magnitude relative to the
effects estimated on low‐performing centers. Registrations are also estimated to decrease at high‐
performing centers in response to the regulation. Therefore, there is little evidence for a transfer in
volume from low‐performing to high‐performing centers in periods following the CMS policy. Focusing on
special medical and biological conditions for the pool of patients registered, results imply that even though
centers are risk‐compensated for transplants conducted on highly sensitized patients, the policy does not
seem to influence registration of such patients at low‐performing centers (Table 2b).
The number of waiting‐list deaths during any given 6‐month period is estimated to decrease at programs
performing below standards after they become more accountable for performance outcomes (Table 2b).
The regulation leads to about 1 to 2 less waiting‐list deaths per period. The significance of the policy effect
on transplant programs, more specifically for those eligible for a quality review on graft survival outcomes,
implies that more accountability for these centers prevents deaths but at a cost of relatively larger
reductions in transplants. It is also worth mentioning that the number of death occurrences is correlated
with the size of the waiting list and, therefore, with the number of registrations at a particular center.
Consequently, the decline in registrations across low‐performing centers post regulation mechanically
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I define high‐performing centers as centers with observed 1‐year rates of graft and patient survival larger than the
corresponding expected rates. In addition, they have a one‐sided
of the difference between the observed and
expected events (graft failure and patient death) less than or equal to 0.05.
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reduces the probability that a patient will die at these centers while waiting for an organ. A comparison
of the coefficient estimates suggests that for every prevented waiting‐list death there are about 3 less
registrations when focusing on total grafts outcomes and about 7 less registrations for total patient
outcomes at treated centers. While raw data and trends over time suggest an important increase in the
average number of patients removed from the waiting list at low‐performing centers for causes other
than transplantation and death, after controlling for center‐specific attributes, the regulation is estimated
to have a positive (i.e. an increase in the number of de‐listings) but insignificant effect on this outcome,
up to 0.5 more de‐listings per period.
The autocorrelation resulting from clustering of standard errors can explain statistical insignificance in
coefficient estimates. Moreover, statistical insignificance might also result from controlling for center’s
fixed effects that capture most of the heterogeneity across centers. Nonetheless, evidence is shown that
controlling for centers’ heterogeneity is important in identifying the effect of the CMS regulation on
provision of care (e.g. organ utilization) (Schnier et al. 2014a).
This study provides indications that affected centers respond in desirable ways with a modest increase in
quality of transplants and lower waiting‐list deaths. Nonetheless, the costs of the policy are relatively high
with a significant reduction in the number of transplants, accentuated by lower registration rates over
time.
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Table 3: Quantile Regression Low Performance Status Effect with CMS Rule on Volume of Transplants

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

10th Percentile

25th Percentile

50th Percentile

75th Percentile

90th Percentile

Total Grafts

Subject to Quality Review

‐2.4116*

‐3.2449***

‐4.8649***

‐4.9678***

‐4.5744***

(1.338)

(0.764)

(1.116)

(1.692)

(1.138)

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

Observations

‐3.6785**

‐3.9034***

‐4.8128***

‐4.4429***

‐5.0854**

(1.516)

(1.169)

(1.352)

(1.659)

(1.979)

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Coefficients on covariates are available upon request
Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.

1. Sensitivity Analysis and Placebo Test
The difference‐in‐difference analysis above estimated an average treatment effect of the regulation.
Nonetheless, there could be concerns about heterogeneity in the impact of the regulation at different
positions in the distribution of transplants volume (high volume centers vs. low volume centers). This issue
is handled by re‐estimating equation (1) using quantile regressions for each treatment, separately.55
Results from this estimation are presented in Table 3. Being eligible for a quality review has a negative
and significant effect at all points in the distribution of transplants volume, regardless of the treatment
type considered. There is an increasing trend as a center moves up in the distribution of transplants
volume, from ‐2.41 to ‐4.97 for total grafts and from ‐3.68 to ‐5.09 for total patients. When considering

55

The STATA 11 “qreg2” quantile regression function is used with robust and clustered standard errors and estimated equation
(1) at specific quantiles (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9) of the transplants volume distribution.
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each treatment type separately, the coefficients are not statistically different from each other across
quantiles. Hence, there is no evidence for heterogeneity in treatment effects on volume of transplants.
A series of regressions is further estimated using a different set of covariates with transplants volume as
the outcome variable (Table 4). Selected results on other outcome variables used in Tables 2a & 2b are
presented in Tables A3a‐A3e. The second column in Tables A3a‐A3e reports results from Tables 2a & 2b
including covariates and both center and period fixed effects. General findings show extreme sensitivity
of the regulation effects to centers’ fixed effects. In fact, both the treatment effect and significance of the
coefficient estimates for transplants volume disappear when centers’ time‐invariant characteristics are
not accounted for in the model. Such variations confirm the importance of center heterogeneity in
accurately estimating the regulation effect.56
In another check, I employ a placebo test that consists in evaluating the impact of the policy change on a
variable that should in principles not be affected by more accountability. If a significant association or
correlation is found between the policy variable and the placebo outcome, the validity of the initial model
will be questioned. The test is conducted using patient’s height in meters as the placebo outcome and
equation (1) is estimated. Results are reported in Table 5 and suggest as expected that the CMS Final Rule
has an insignificant effect on (adult) patient’s height. These results reinforce the causal effects estimated
in Tables 2a & 2b.

56

In regressions not displayed in the paper, I also account for potential correlation between outcomes in two consecutive
periods. The first lag value of the outcome of interest is included in the regressions. In general, results are robust to these
additional covariates.
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Table 4: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Transplants Volume
Total Grafts

Subject to Quality Review

‐5.7428***

‐5.6420***

‐4.0570***

‐3.8858***

‐5.4922
(3.343)

(1.231)

(1.231)

(1.427)

(1.429)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Total Patients

‐5.1146**

‐5.2949**

‐0.2326

‐0.6106

‐1.2213

(2.142)

(2.130)

(1.883)

(1.865)

(5.101)

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Subject to Quality Review
Covariatesa

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures. Specifications without period fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Table 5: The Effect of the CMS Final Rule on Patients’ Height
VARIABLES
Subject to Quality Review

Observations
R‐squared

(1)
Total Grafts

(2)
Total Patients

‐0.0020
(0.004)

0.0046
(0.004)

2,907
0.393

2,907
0.393

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.

2.

Testing for Differential in Pre‐treatment Trends and Anticipatory Effects of the Regulation

The empirical analysis concludes with an evaluation of the difference in pre‐treatment trends suggested
by Figure 2. This new specification accounts for the fact that the regulation was passed in March 2007 but
fully implemented in July 2007. The variable "

" is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if

the center satisfied all three non‐compliance thresholds for low performance in the first half of 2007
(January to June 2007), which represents the time period during which the regulation was published but
not fully implemented.57 "

" is defined the same as "

". The

model includes the same set of covariates as in the regression with transplants volume being the outcome
variable in Table 2a. The policy effects in both the publication period and the periods after
implementation are negative for both treatment types (Table 6). The magnitudes of the coefficient
estimates for

are in the range of estimates in Table 2a with an average decrease of nearly

57

Recall that I considered full implementation of the regulation starting at t=10 which technically covers July 1, 2007 until
December 31, 2007.
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Table 6: The Effect of the CMS Final Rule with the Effect of the Regulation Publication Period on
Transplants Volume
VARIABLES
Passed (

9)

Implemented (

10)

Observations
R‐squared

(1)
Total Grafts

(2)
Total Patients

‐2.4506
(1.825)
‐6.0621***
(1.280)

‐5.1517**
(2.068)
‐5.9491***
(2.247)

2,959
0.919

2,959
0.919

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.

6 transplants per period. When considering the publication period, only the effect for total patients is
statistically different from zero and low‐performing centers experience a change of about 2.5 to 5 less
transplants on average relative to centers in the control group. A possible explanation for the difference
in magnitudes of the regulation effect during the first semester of 2007 resides in the fact that graft
failures are relatively more frequent than patient deaths. In fact, the average expected graft survival in
the sample (3,186 center‐period observations) is 89.54% versus 93.22% for expected patient survival. A t‐
test for the null hypothesis of equality between mean expected graft survival rates and mean expected
patient survival rates is strongly rejected (p‐value = 0.000). This difference in expected outcomes entails
that it is fairly difficult for centers to improve on performance outcomes once they are flagged for low
performance on total patient survival. These results do not affect interpretation of the causal estimates
found in Table 2a.
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VI. Conclusion
As part of the objective to introduce accountability into the operations of transplant centers, the CMS
introduced quality reviews and improvement agreements with a possibility for losing (re)certification for
Medicare coverage. Centers are being evaluated based on empirically determined performance measures
including three non‐compliance thresholds. This chapter investigates the effect of these very provisions
of the CMS policy on performance of transplant centers and ultimately on patients’ welfare.
Although the CMS did not anticipate any impact on the number of organ transplants since the regulation
did not directly affect the supply of organs available for transplantation, the difference‐in‐difference
estimates provide evidence for an undesirable effect of the CMS Final Rule on transplants volume across
treatment types. For every 1 graft failure avoided per 6‐month period, low‐performing centers conduct
about 10 less transplants post CMS Final Rule. The estimated decrease in transplants is mainly driven by
a reduction in standard criteria donors transplants. In addition, patient registrations significantly decrease
at low‐performing centers after they are held more accountable with up to 9 less registrations per period.
The number of deaths at low‐performing centers also decreases but the decrease is not significant enough
to compensate the impact of lower registrations on patients’ welfare.
Notwithstanding insignificance of some of the coefficient estimates, it can be inferred that although the
regulation led to a lower volume of graft failures at low‐performing centers and to a decline of waiting‐
list deaths the net impact was negative on patients’ welfare. Access to transplantation is rendered difficult
with an important decrease in transplants volume and registrations at centers performing below
standards for both treatments.
A series of heterogeneity tests, sensitivity analysis, and placebo test reinforce the causal estimates found
with the difference‐in‐difference estimations. There is also evidence that centers which are flagged for
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low performance take some anticipatory actions leading to a reduction in transplants volume in the period
during which the regulation was passed but not fully implemented.
General conclusions are that the institutional environment plays a very important role in the way
transplant programs operate because centers’ provision of care is found to be greatly affected by
monitoring. Results also show that the tradeoffs inherent in policy making could lean toward undesirable
outcomes for the population of interest. Hence, the CMS might consider providing additional incentives
to centers in order to alleviate the negative impacts of the current regulation on patients’ welfare. More
risk‐adjustment measures could provide such incentives by taking into consideration characteristics of the
centers. In the event that current realities might deter policy modifications or refinements, it is important
for the CMS to be aware of the unintended consequences of the regulation change.
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Chapter III: The Regulatory Impact of the CMS CoP on Patient Selection of Transplant Centers
This chapter evaluates the effect of quality information on choice of transplantation service providers.
The Scientific Registry of Transplant recipients (SRTR) program reports provide detailed information on
transplant center performance relative to risk‐adjusted expected values. This program publishes reports
as part of the national program to report hospital outcomes for solid organ transplants since 1991
(Howard and Kaplan, 2006). The reported measures are utilized by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) for their conditions of participation (CoPs), effective June 28, 2007. The CMS CoP is
designed to improve patient outcomes. However, these report cards may influence patient’s decision to
be placed on a center’s waiting list. ESRD patients sort across centers according to their preference for
healthcare provision, centers’ attributes and their own characteristics. The aggregation of these patient
choices may impact the flows within a transplant center and the queuing of patients on a center’s waiting
list and therefore influence the provision of care. In this analysis, I present a qualitative choice model for
selection of kidney transplant centers by patients on the deceased donor waiting list (DDWL) for kidney
transplants between 2003 and 2010. I am interested first in how report cards affect patient choice of
transplant centers. Secondly, I examine whether the patients’ response to the report cards vary depending
on which report card is missed. Here, I would like to account for variations in the effects of the different
triggers used by the CMS to evaluate transplant centers. I resort to a sorting equilibrium model, a type of
Random Utility Models (RUMs) to serve my purpose. RUMs have gained popularity in research examining
individual’s behavior in making choice among a discrete set of alternatives. Sorting equilibrium models
use the properties of market equilibria in addition to information on patients’ behavior to infer structural
parameters that describe heterogeneity in preferences. Such models reflect the information available to
participating agents, their constraints, the implications associated with their combined choices (Kuminoff
et al., 2010).
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The sorting equilibrium employed in my analysis will also measure the level of congestion, a factor that
provides information on the number of people encountered during registration. Congestion may be a very
important determinant of the registration process and estimating a measure of this attribute might help
explain isolation of some centers with respect to others. By introducing congestion in my model, I want
to investigate how and to what extent apparent feelings of crowding that are influenced by experience at
a center affect ESRD patients in their choice for a center. I hypothesize that the regulatory environment,
centers’ attributes, and individual characteristics also matter in access to transplantation.
The impact of distance to transplant centers in this decision making process is further examined. The time
of preservation for solid organs is very limited and transplants have to be performed in a timely manner
upon organ availability. Consequently, transplant candidates are encouraged to reside near their
transplant centers. I augment the analysis by adding other center‐specific covariates including transplant
volume, demographic composition of the center’s patient population, extended criteria donor (ECD)
transplant volume at the center, and center‐specific performance variables reported by the SRTR. ECD
transplants volume, together with performance variable, provides important information on the organ
utilization rate across transplant centers over time.
Conditional logit (CL) results indicate that a transplant center’s failure to meet either the 1‐year organ
transplant decreases the probability that a patient will elect to be placed on the center’s waiting list versus
those centers that are spatial proximate. Additional covariates, reducing the likelihood of a patient being
listed at a transplant center are the distance traveled to the center, and an increase in the proportion of
high‐risk patients (e.g. patients with immune systems that increase the probability of organ transplant
rejection, patients with high BMI). Covariates that increase the probability of listing are the number of
ECD organ transplants performed within the last year, the number of white, black, female patients and
the number of patients with diabetes. Findings from the sorting equilibrium model concur with the CL
results on the effect of most of the demographic characteristics of centers’ waiting list. However, the
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regulation effects vanish once I take into account competitive interactions between transplant programs
and center‐level heterogeneity. Results suggest that the negative effect of centers’ quality information
estimated in the CL model is mostly driven by center‐level heterogeneity and the competitive interactions
between centers. The sorting models show importance and evidence for a strong congestion effect on
centers’ selection.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections I and II provide a review of the literature and
brief background on the regulation. The theoretical framework is introduced in Section III. The data used
is described in section IV and the following section (V) presents the empirical analysis and estimation
results. A conclusion is provided in Section VI.
I.

Literature Review

A few studies have explored the use of report cards, which provide important information on quality of
care, on patient choice of hospitals. Nonetheless, they have focused mainly on patients seeking cardiac
surgery in the states of New York and Pennsylvania. In general, these studies find mixed results on how
using hospital quality information affects patient market share. Some researchers have identified that
patients (or referring physicians) may use information available in making informed decision. Using
information from New York State Cardiac Surgery Reports, Mukamel and Mushlin (1996) examined
whether hospitals and surgeon’s market share and prices increased as a results of reported better
outcomes. They found that the response of patients and referring physicians to the quality information
available leads to an increase in market share and charges for better performing health care providers. In
a recent article comparing data before and after the report cards were first published in December 1991,
Mukamel et al. (2004/2005) found that although patient selection of surgeons was influenced by the
explicit quality information published, low educated individuals and black patients surgeon choices were
not affected by surgeons’ quality. Cutler et al. (2004) used a similar approach by investigating the influence
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of report cards on outcomes of patients seeking coronary bypass surgery and their allocation among
individual providers in New York State. They register a significant decline in procedures at high‐mortality
facilities by about 10 percent. Dranone and Skefas (2008) also documented positive effects of quality
information on patient market share after applying a structural model of “news” on quality information
available in report cards between 1989 and 1991 in New York State. When examining report cards for
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) but in the state of Pennsylvania, Wang et al. (2011) estimated a
significant decrease in the likelihood that patients be treated by poor‐performing surgeons and providers.
Research using data from other sources also imply importance of providers’ quality information
dissemination on patient choice. Bundorf et al. (2009) oriented their analysis on the market of fertility
clinics providing Assisted Reproductive Therapies (ART). Their findings were also in line with previous
research suggesting that patients take into account quality information in report cards when choosing
among providers of ART. In this analysis using data from America’s Best Hospitals Pope (2009) found that
an improvement in hospital ranking attracted more patients. Data from the nursing home (post‐acute
care) market do not suggest otherwise (Werner et al. 2012). These different analyses provide some
evidence that consumers are more attracted to facilities with higher clinical outcomes (Jung et al. 2011).
Nonetheless, other studies report minimal use of quality information by patients and referring physicians.
An earlier research by Schneider and Epstein (1996) investigated cardiologists (referring physicians) and
cardiac surgeons’ awareness of the Consumer Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery published
in Pennsylvania since 1992. Using post‐report data from 1995, they find that cardiovascular specialist
attributed limited credibility to the quality information provided. In a more recent study of the May 2002
Consumer Guide to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery, Epstein (2010) compared referral patterns for
CABG in Pennsylvania to those of a counterfactual scenario using data from Florida (a state without these
report cards) between 2001 and 2002. Conforming with previous research findings, no significant
differences were documented in his analysis in referral patterns to either high‐mortality or low‐mortality
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surgeons. In a study analyzing hospital discharge data that evaluate patient choice, Mennemeyer et al.
(1997) find that consumers did not seem to use hospital mortality reports, published by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) between 1986 and 1992, when selecting facilities. The observed lack of
influence on hospital utilization following publication of the mortality reports resulted in the HCFA
eliminating such reports.
In their analysis focusing on report cards on coronary bypass surgery mortality in New York and acute
myocardial infraction mortality and postdiskectomy in California, Romano and Zhou (2004) show that the
effect of quality information on volume of procedures for outliers is modest and mostly restricted to New
York white Medicare patients. I contribute to this line of research by studying a different market, the
market for transplantation, and by investigating the role of performance quality information on choice of
transplant centers.
The theme in this chapter is closely related to a study conducted by Howard and Kaplan (2006). In their
analysis the authors focused on examining the effect of kidney transplant centers’ quality report cards on
patient demand between 1999 and 2002. They find that, in general, report cards do not have a significant
impact on patient choice. It is noteworthy to emphasize that Howard and Kaplan (2006) analysis covered
a period prior to the CMS CoPs. To my knowledge, this research is the first attempt at tackling the question
of transplant center choice in the midst of the current and more stringent regulatory environment. I rely
on data available both before and after the regulation was implemented to disentangle the role played
by the CMS CoPs in patients’ decision making process. In addition, this analysis describes and evaluates
sorting behavior of ESRD patients through a random utility model. Finally, it introduces the idea of
congestion as an important center attribute influencing this decision making process.
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II.

Background

Effective June 28, 2007, transplant centers are required to provide public reports on transplantations from
all types of donors and patient outcomes for performance evaluation to the CMS. These reports use data
from 2.5‐year rolling cohorts of individuals. For example, the reports published in June 2007 use outcomes
from patients transplanted between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2006. Although report cards publish
performance information pertaining to both 1‐year and 3‐year patient and organ transplant survival
outcomes, I focus exclusively on the 1‐year performance variables that are used by the CMS for evaluation.
Under the CMS CoP, a transplant program performance is considered inadmissible if its observed survival
rates are lower than its expected survival rates in addition to satisfying the following conditions: 1) the
difference between the number of observed events (patient deaths or graft failure) and the number of
expected events is greater than 3 [

3]; 2) the ratio of the number of observed events to the

number of expected events is greater than 1.5 [ /

1.5]; and 3) the one‐sided p‐value, based on an

exact Poisson test for the difference between the observed and expected events, is less than 0.05 [
0.05] (CMS, 2007). These standards are binding for kidney and liver transplant centers seeking
(re)certification for Medicare coverage. Moreover, the CMS introduced a sanction associated non‐
compliance with the CoPs: Medicare de‐certification. This sanction has significant implications for
transplant center because Medicare is the primary insurance that ESRD patients utilize to cover for
medical expenses.
III.

Theoretical Framework

RUMs have been used in the urban economics literature, where economists have estimated demand for
recreation under conditions of congestion. Sorting equilibrium models with congestion focused on
demand for recreational sites. The congestion effect occurs when utility of an individual changes due to
the presence of others at the site. Congestion, therefore, creates some negative externality on the
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individual: it is treated as a non‐market bad (Jakus and Shaw, 1997). Putting this definition into context,
congestion can, therefore, occur with only a few people choosing a particular transplant center.
Congestion would, therefore, reduce the value of a center.
Models using in sorting equilibrium research are credited to early work by Berry et al. (1995), analyzing
equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry. In subsequent research, Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007) have
developed equilibrium properties for estimating sorting models across location sites. Timmins and
Murdock (2007) further extend this work introducing a revealed preference approach to measuring
congestion in demand for recreational sites using instrumental variable models.
My analysis draws from the existing theory on the demand for spatial locations and closely follows the
methodology developed by Hicks et al. (2012). I apply a sorting equilibrium model with congestion, as a
RUM of demand for health via transplantation. I assume in this model that there is a tradeoff between
length of travel and attributes of the transplant center. One of the main assumptions of RUMs is that the
choice of each alternative is governed by the existence of a latent utility. Moreover, individuals are
assumed to be rational agents that maximize an indirect utility subject to a set of constraints. In such
qualitative choice models, the utility is, therefore, a function of attributes describing each choice
alternative and the cost (i.e. distance to the transplant center) incurred for choosing a specific alternative.
The general cost of choosing an alternative will increase with the presence of other people on the waiting
list. This simplified model assumes away any monetary cost associated with travel to a center. A
congestion condition becomes an important attribute in attaching value to a transplant center and will be
based on on‐site experience: it is, therefore, related to perceived feelings of crowding from a longer
waiting list during registration at a particular center.
Results in the existing literature on sorting equilibrium models have demonstrated that modeling location
choice without taking a congestion parameter into account can lead to several consequences: 1) the
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rationing nature of congestion is not accounted for in the estimation; 2) a potential correlation between
congestion and other centers’ specific characteristics can create bias in the estimates; 3) the value of the
centers will not be accurately estimated especially in the event of removal of larger transplant programs
that would occasion re‐sorting (transferring) of patients across other centers (Timmins and Murdock,
2007). This last consequence implies an important relationship between welfare of ESRD patients and
termination or long‐term inactivity of a large enough transplant program that would necessitate re‐sorting
of displaced patients.
Since I observe the actual choices made for each transplant candidate, this model will be based on
revealed preference rather than a stated preference approach. I use patients’ registrations as the unit of
observation in a given period, based on a Nash Equilibrium (sorting) model. This assumes that each
registration is an independent event, even though some individuals might be listed at multiple centers.58
In such a case, all multiple listings are considered as “different” individuals that will contribute to the
estimation of congestion in the main model. Individual chooses a transplant center among a set of
choice alternatives

1, 2, … ,

in any given period (

1, 2, … , ). I have also introduced a time

dimension in our model, , which represents the 6‐month interval of time used by the SRTR for publishing
report cards of centers. I will neither model the number of registrations made by a transplant candidate
over the entire period of study, nor will I model (monetary) travel cost incurred by transplant candidate
in choosing center .
The utility obtained from choosing a transplant center is given by:
,

(1)

58

Multiple listing occurs when an individual registers at more than one center while still waiting for a transplant. Multiple listing
is permitted and allows the patient to benefit from supply of organs in other areas. I will not talk about multiple listing if an
individual registered, got a transplant, and then returned back on the waiting list after an organ transplant failure for example.
The proportion of multiple listings represents a small proportion of patient registrations, less than 10% of active listings.
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Where

,

(2)

is a vector of observable characteristics that vary across candidates (e.g. distance traveled to the
center, waiting list patient characteristics at the center);
alternative in period (e.g. performance status of the center).

is a vector of observable attributes of
is a (scalar) unobservable attribute of

center : this alternative‐varying attribute is the same for all candidates).
affecting utility of candidate

at choice

in period ; and

is an idiosyncratic error

is the expected share of all candidates

choosing center in period .
Following Hicks et al. (2012),

represents the baseline utility from choice in period , which is the utility

that a patient with all elements of
the sign of

being zero would receive. According to sorting equilibrium models,

will define congestion (‐) or agglomeration (+) in the utility function. A negative

(i.e.

congestion effect) will be expected in our context. Assuming that the 2007 CMS CoP exerts some influence
on organ utilization rates and creates competition among centers and physicians for a better
performance, I anticipate that the new regulation would create and/or accentuate congestion in our
model.
Candidates are assumed to have rational expectations about other patients’ behavior. This assumption
implies a constant vector of expected shares,

, across individuals: the expected share becomes

equivalent to the actual share of all individuals choosing any center. The model used in this analysis allows
preference to fluctuate with multiple observable center’s attributes and congestion. Thus, our model is
set up as a heterogeneous parameter discrete choice model.
In order to achieve equilibrium, each patient will maximize their utility from choosing center

given

expectations about the behavior of fellow transplant candidates. The idiosyncratic error term in the utility
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function,

, is assumed to be distributed independently and identically extreme value: this implies the

use of a logit model. The probability of transplant candidate choosing alternative becomes:

∀

,

(4)

∑

Then the predicted share of candidates choosing center in period is:
∑

∀

,

(5)

Estimation of Equation (1) will be done using maximum likelihood and one can show that the equilibrium
in the case of congestion is unique. Unlike agglomeration, congestion is a stable equilibrium (Hicks et al.,
2012). The likelihood of observing a vector of center choices can then be written as follows:
, | , ,

s.t.

∗

∏∈ ∏
∑

∏

∀

∀

,

,

,

∀ ,t

(6)

(7)

is the number of candidates’ registrations in each period,

is an indicator variable that takes the

value of unity if individual chooses center in period and zero otherwise. An estimate of the baseline
utility,

, for each center is obtained from maximizing Equation (6) with respect to the vector

,

.

∗

represents the observed equilibrium shares of patients in center in period . This maximization allows
estimation of parameters describing the variation in utility for different center’s attributes conditional on
the candidate’s observable characteristics. Contraction mapping technique provided by Berry (1994) will
be used to recover the entire set of baseline utilities. 59

59

and , which are part of the baseline utility, are

This technique consists in choosing values for and finding the vector of
shares and actual shares.
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’s that will satisfy equality between predicted

not yet estimated at this point. This mapping guarantees that the actual shares will satisfy Equation (7).
For each iteration, , the contraction mapping function becomes:
∗

,

(7)

This specification guarantees that for any value of , the center‐specific constants (

) converge toward

the observed sorting equilibrium.
In general, there is an issue of endogeneity associated with the estimation of models with congestion. The
endogeneity issue arises because of a non‐zero correlation between congestion and the unobserved
heterogeneity determining behavior of the decision maker. Hence, endogeneity arises because of the
mechanical correlation between the expected probability of all candidates choosing a particular
alternative and the unobservable attributes of that alternative through equilibrium sorting (Timmins and
Murdock, 2007). Consequently, more attractive centers with a higher baseline utility will be expected to
have more desirable unobserved characteristics. Endogeneity of the congestion parameter becomes a
result of having the same unobservable center attributes affecting both the decision of other candidates
(determining

) and the decision of the candidate of interest—statistical endogeneity. I will control for

the potential correlation between
become an issue once I decompose
correlation between

and

and

non‐parametrically with

. However, endogeneity will

(as in Equation (2)). Based on equilibrium sorting models, the

is positive, implying that centers with desirable unobservable attributes

will be more attractive and have a higher baseline utility.
In the literature using revealed preference techniques, Boxall et al. (2001) use information about
attributes of sites (i.e.

) and information on the agents’ characteristics to predict anticipated

congestion. I will use a similar identification technique in our model for choice of transplant centers.
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A solution to the identification problem comes with the use of an IV estimator for Equation (2). A
candidate instrument will be valid if it is correlated with
instruments for

but has no identified effect on

. Valid

will be constructed as combinations of the exogenous attributes of neighboring

centers other than . The intuition is that each transplant candidate will maximize their utility using
combinations of centers’ attributes given the available set of alternatives.60 As I assume zero correlation
and

between

, I can extend this assumption to a zero correlation between

and

Using a particular function proposed in Bayer and Timmins (2007) as an instrument for

.
, the predicted

share is now defined as follows:

∑

(8)

∑

Predictive power of the instrument will be significant if the exogenous attributes are important
determinants in choosing among transplant centers.61 In order to proceed with the IV estimation, I
compute initial values for

by estimating both Equations (2) and (6), ignoring endogeneity. The

instruments in (8) are calculated using the estimates for

and then are used in the IV estimation of

Equation (2). An issue that occurs with using the IV approach is that some estimates of all parameters but
the coefficients associated with the probability of ESRD patients choosing alternative have to be available
for identification of the latter ones. The strength of the instruments used will be positively correlated with
dissimilarities in the exogenous attributes between centers.62

60

I recognize that this is a weak identification strategy but it is the conventional method used in the literature on sorting
models.
61 The attributes of centers other than are assumed to be exogenous to characteristics of center . For example, transplants
volume determined by organ acceptance policies at center are assumed not to be affected by transplants volume at other
centers. Similarly, the volume of transplants from ECDs at center should not be correlated in any way to those of other facilities.
62 An implication for our measure of congestion would be to possibly increase efficiency with which transplant centers can provide
services/treatment.
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IV.

Data and Variables Creation

I use data on ESRD patients on the United States deceased donor waiting list for Kidney transplantation
between 2003 and 2010. The period of study is motivated by the main concern to investigate how the
enactment of the CMS Final Rule on June 28, 2007 impacted choice behavior of ESRD patients. I am
interested in evaluating the overall effect of the regulation change, which requires data both before and
after the regulation. The primary data source is the United Network for Organ Sharing Standard Transplant
Analysis and Research (UNOS STAR), which collects information on transplant candidates including basic
demographics, medical conditions, dates of listing(s) and transplantation—if any—that are provided on
the registration forms at the transplant center. The analysis is restricted to ESRD patients aged at least 18
years and their transplant center choices. I have also simplified the decision making process by considering
the patient as the sole decision maker. However, I acknowledge that in reality the decision process is more
complex and it is the joint product from inputs of the individual, their nephrologist (the physician), and
their insurance.
SRTR reports for each of the 228 transplant centers were merged with the UNOS STAR data to create a
binary indicator variable for whether or not a transplant center meets either the 1‐year total graft survival
or 1‐year total patient survival CMS CoP criteria.63 Additional transplant center‐specific variable are
created to control for the number of ECD transplants and the demographic composition of a center’s
waiting list. I also account for the fact that transplant programs can be active or inactive at different points
in time. A dummy variable capturing this change in activity schedule is included in the estimation. The
activity‐inactivity schedule implies that patients have different choice sets over time. The final sample
includes registration information for 245,090 individuals between 2003 and 2010.

63

Evaluation report cards were published biannually (June and December) and a total of eight sets of report cards were used.
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The vector of center’s attributes,

, includes distance to transplant center . I am concerned in the

influence of the distance factor because of the urgency of the procedure. Distance has an effect on travel
time to the center, and time itself is a very important determinant of organ quality. Most solid organs
cannot be preserved for a long time: kidneys can only be preserved for up to 48 hours outside a human
body (HRSA 2008). Another argument for investigating the importance of distance is that while awaiting
transplantation—which takes years—patients are usually under the care of their referring nephrologist
because in most cases they are still undergoing dialysis treatment. Although I am not modeling them in
this analysis, I realize that there are non‐medical costs including travel costs to and from the transplant
center before and after the operation, food, lodging, child care, and potential lost wages for workers,
associated with the entire process (getting dialysis at a hospital and listing and eventually being
transplanted at another facility). These reasons provide some additional intuition for the importance of
distance as a proxy for both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary costs in the decision making process for a
transplant program. Furthermore, this model is different from a regular hospital choice model like the
model presented in Geweke at al. (2003) for patients admitted at the emergency room where treatment
service is immediate.
The UNOS STAR data provides information on transplant centers selected at listing and the permanent zip
codes of transplant candidates both at listing and at transplantation (for individuals who ever get a
transplant). I collected the exact address of the centers based on information available on their official
websites and from the Health Resources and Services Administration website (HRSA, 2013). I further used
the Census Bureau’s TIGER shapefiles 2012 to obtain the latitude and longitude coordinates for the
centers’ addresses and computed the distances to the transplant center using the centroid of the
individuals’ permanent zip codes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).64

64

These calculations were done using ArcGIS software, ArcMap 10.
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The other center‐specific attributes include the proportion of “active” white transplant candidates and
active black candidates to account for the racial composition of centers’ waiting list on any given date of
interest; the proportion of female patients actively listed, the number of ECD transplants conducted in
the last 365 days from the individual’s listing date; and the number of transplants from ECDs performed
in the past 365 days.65 The number of active listings for patients with medical conditions such as high
sensitization (

80) and diabetes are also included.66 I further control for the average BMI of

individuals on the active waiting list in my model. These center‐specific characteristics were calculated
going back to the first registration record for the centers, which could be as early as January 1, 1972. Using
performance information provided in the biannual report cards, I create center‐specific indicators for
meeting the three non‐compliance thresholds defined in the CMS CoP for 1‐year graft survival and 1‐year
patient survival outcomes.
1.

Descriptive Statistics

Although one could argue that the choice of a center does not matter as much as the timing of registration
on the national deceased donor waiting list, the nature of the organ allocation process makes us believe
that sorting across transplant centers based on center attributes and patient characteristics might impact
access to transplantation. Organ procurement and allocation is handled at the geographical level by Organ
Procurement Organizations (OPOs). In addition, centers can only be affiliated with one OPO: no multiple
memberships. The market for transplant centers is, therefore, better defined at the OPO level. Figure 1
shows the distribution of OPOs and transplant centers across the U.S.. Based on UNOS STAR patient
registration and transplantation information from 2003 to 2010, about 81.57% of kidney transplants were

65Active listings

represent the current wait list for a transplant center and they are computed using all registrations at a particular
transplant center subtracting all removals from the waiting list up to a particular listing date.
66
This characteristic indicates the degree to which a patient will react immunologically to transplantation. It is measured with a
blood test on the individual’s panel reactive antibody (
) which ranges between 0 and 100. The higher the
, the more
likely the immune system of the individual is to fight a foreign body and increase the likelihood of graft rejection.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) and Transplant Center across the U.S.

Source: The Authors’ Compilation

made from organs recovered at the local area (OPO) level, 5.68% from allocation at the regional level, and
12.75% at the national level.
The allocation hierarchy is justified by the limited conservation time for organs. Based on the current
allocation process, access to (kidney) transplantation will greatly depend on the “local” supply of organs
and the “local” demand (i.e. waiting list). Due to variation in supply of organs across areas, individuals
could have the incentive to relocate to areas with relatively more supply, therefore, affecting the existing
demand in both their “home” area and the “host” area. Nevertheless, medical conditions of the patient
and monetary costs associated with relocation could preclude such relocation. It is also important to
recognize that rationing will occur in this market both as a result of limited supply of organs and
differences in eligibility criteria at transplant centers.
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Beside the factor distance, I hypothesize that the current regulatory environment will have an important
role in this decision making process. Provided the stringent CMS CoPs and the environment in which they
operate, physicians at transplant centers might be more selective on the types of organs accepted for
transplantation to maximize performance outcomes. Thus, the new regulation creates a platform for
competition among centers for performance at least at par with the set rules. Furthermore, with public
information available on centers’ performance patients could make better informed decisions. They
could, therefore, gravitate to centers with desirable characteristics and higher organ utilization rates for
example, increasing their chances of getting a transplant but creating congestion at the same time.
I constructed data on key variables for all possible alternatives in addition to existing data on center’s
choice. Combining these features from the stated preference approach, I will be able to predict the
probability of choice or predict market share of a new alternative based on attributes of that alternative
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Such an analysis is made possible with variability of all regressors across the
alternatives: Hence, parameters are alternative‐invariant for identification.
The primary goal for estimating congestion in this analysis is to show that it plays an important role in how
individuals attach value to transplant centers when deciding to register on the waiting list. Alternative‐
varying attributes imply competition among these centers to acquire ESRD patient listings. In economic
theory, competition is desirable because it can result in reduced prices (desirable for the consumers)
and/or increase productivity for suppliers. The welfare effect of competition is a reduction of deadweight
loss that could occur as a result of non‐competitive markets. In the context of transplantation, the price
for a transplant is fixed. Transplant centers are instead competing for a scarce resource (i.e. ESRD patients)
from which they obtain the fixed payment—from the insurance company (e.g. CMS for those using
Medicare as their primary insurance)—for the transplant. I anticipate that competition among transplant
centers will affect access to transplantation.
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Table 1 : Summary Statistics for ESRD Patients (2003‐2010)
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

KI (=1 if organ registered for is Kidney; =0 for simultaneous
Kidney/pancreas)a

245090

0.95

0.22

0

1

Age at Listing

245090

49.91

13.08

18

91

Female

245090

0.40

0.49

0

1

White

245090

0.49

0.50

0

1

Ethnicity
Black

245090

0.28

0.45

0

1

Hispanic

245090

0.15

0.36

0

1

Asian

245090

0.06

0.23

0

1

Other Ethnicity Category

245090

0.02

0.13

0

1

239028

27.82

5.68

10.00

59.73

Diabetes

240002

0.44

0.50

0

1

BMI at Listing

Medical Condition At Listing
Type I Diabetes

240002

0.11

0.32

0

1

Type II Diabetes

240002

0.25

0.43

0

1

Highly Sensitized

198997

0.04

0.20

0

1

Notes: a When allocating kidneys, patients registered for kidney only or simultaneous kidney and pancreas are considered.

Descriptive statistics for waiting list patients and center‐specific characteristics between 2003 and 2010
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The typical transplant candidate is a white male, aged 50 years (Table 1).
About 44% of transplant candidates have diabetes—one of the leading causes of ESRD. On average, ESRD
patients would travel about 78 miles to their transplant center of choice. Table 2 provides summary
statistics at the center’s level. On a typical day between January 1, 2003 and September 3, 2010, the size
of the waiting list was about 756 registrations at the average facility. On average, there are about 121
transplants performed over a year at the average facility. 13 of these transplants (around 11%) are
conducted from ECD donors. ECD transplants are performed to reduce the gap between the increasing
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Table 2 : Summary Statistics for Characteristics of Transplant Centers (2003‐2010)
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

78.36

221.05

0.0004

7564.91

Active Listings

756.26

895.84

0

5369

Number of Transplants conducted the last 365 days

121.85

80.97

0

357

Number of ECD Transplants conducted the last 365 days

13.21

11.66

0

78

Ratio of Active White Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.44

0.19

0

1

Ratio of Active Black Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.33

0.20

0

1

Ratio of Active Female Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.42

0.05

0

1

Average BMI of Patients on The Active Waiting List

26.90

2.02

0

36

Ratio of Active Diabetic Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.39

0.08

0

1

Ratio of Active Type I Diabetic Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.07

0.06

0

1

Ratio of Active Type II Diabetic Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.18

0.13

0

1

Ratio of Active Highly Sensitive Patient Listings to Active Listings

0.05

0.04

0

1

Low Performance Graft Triggerb (74 out 228 centers)

0.05

0.06

0

1

Low Performance Patient Trigger (72 out of 228 centers)

0.06

0.13

0

1

Post CMS CoPs

0.45

0.50

0

1

Low Performance Graft Trigger Post CMS CoPs (48 out of 228)

0.025

0.16

0

1

Low Performance Patient Trigger Post CMS CoPs (44 out of 228)

0.027

0.16

0

1

Distance to Transplant Center (in miles)
a

Notes: N=228 centers and 245,090 patient registrations.
a Historical data going back as early as January 1, 1972 are used for computing current waiting list for each center.
b Triggers are based on the 3 non‐compliance thresholds

demand for organs and the relatively low supply. The average daily proportion of active listings from
white patients is somewhat representative of the proportion of registrations from white ESRD patients
during the period of interest (44% vs. 49%). Black patients constitute about 28% of registrations and 33%
of active listings. Racial composition of active listings suggests a slightly greater access to transplantation
for white patients. Considering performance triggers, 19% to 21% of centers in my sample are identified
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as low performing under the CMS CoP. Nonetheless, registrations at these centers represent less than 3%
of total patient registrations in the sample. This could be indicative of a negative relationship between the
probability of a center being chosen and its performance status necessitating the sorting equilibrium
model to properly identify these effects.
V.

Empirical Analysis and Results

For illustration purposes, I first estimate a CL model for choosing among transplant centers. The CL, unlike
a sorting equilibrium model, does not account for competitive interaction between centers but can
provides valuable information on the importance of variables in qualitative choice of transplant centers.
This model does not require any decomposition of the alternative‐specific constant or baseline utility (
because they are not included in the model (

0∀

)

. I further assume that all covariates have a

constant effect over the years: an average effect is estimated for each covariate. Furthermore, the effects
of the SRTR/CMS triggers to flag centers for low performance on graft survival and patient survival
outcomes are estimated separately.
Table 3 (2nd and 3rd columns) provides results from the conditional logit model. Since I assume that
covariates have the same effect across all alternatives—each element of the betas remains unchanged
across the alternatives—I can interpret the sign of the coefficients as the direction of the regressors’
impact on the probability of choosing a transplant center. However, I cannot make any inference about
the magnitudes of these effects at this point because the betas in the CL are no longer interpreted as
marginal effects.
The factor distance negatively affects the probability choice for each alternative.67 Patients are more
attracted to centers with more actively listed white, black, and diabetic patients. All else constant,

67

For ease of estimation, the factor distance is in 1000 miles in the regressions.
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Table 3: Conditional Logit Model and Sorting Equilibrium Model for Transplant Center Choice
Multinomial Logit
Graft

Patient

Sorting Equilibrium
(1st Stage Estimation)

‐17.707***

‐17.715***

‐21.891***

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.022)

3.658***

3.708***

0.302***

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.020)

1.670***

1.668***

‐1.148***

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.028)

1.322***

1.336***

‐0.115***

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.030)

0.175***

0.146***

‐2.202***

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.048)

‐0.381***

‐0.346***

1.587***

(0.055)

(0.055)

(0.064)

1.597***

1.641***

‐0.696***

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.037)

‐2.070***

‐2.140***

21.071***

(0.107)

(0.107)

(0.126)

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

Variable
Distance (in 1000 miles)

ECD

White

Black

Female

Highly Sensitized

Diabetes

BMI

Low Performance Graft

Triggera

‐0.253***
(0.015)

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)

‐0.041**
(0.020)

Low Performance Patient Trigger

‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)

Number of Observations
Log Likelihood (LL)‐value (0)
LL‐value (fitted value)

‐‐‐

‐0.146***
(0.014)
0.023
(0.019)

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

245,090

245,090

245,090

‐1,308,849

‐1,308,849

‐1,308,849

‐568,257

‐568,573

‐482,704

Notes: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Triggers are based on the 3 non‐compliance thresholds
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performing more ECD transplants increases the likelihood that potential transplant candidates elect to
register at a particular center.68 The effects estimated are highly significant at conventional levels.
Potential transplant candidates will consequently gravitate to centers with higher organ utilization rates.
However, centers with more highly sensitized patients and those that are flagged for low performance on
graft survival or patient survival outcomes are less attractive to prospective candidates. By introducing
the post CMS CoP indicator and an interaction term representing low performance when the regulation
is binding, I am estimating a quasi‐difference‐in‐difference effect for the CMS CoP on selection of centers.
This strategy allows us to disentangle the variation in the likelihood that a center will be chosen that is
attributable to the quality report cards post regulation. Looking at estimates on the interaction terms
between post CMS CoP and low‐performance status, I find a modest and negative effect of the regulation
on the prospect that low‐performing centers on graft outcomes will be chosen.
I then estimate a sorting equilibrium model of patients across transplant programs. As stated earlier, the
sorting model decomposes the center‐specific constants and takes into account center level
heterogeneity. Results from the first stage estimation, which are comparable to coefficients from the CL
model, are displayed in the last column of Table 3. Since the regulatory variables are contained in the
alternative‐specific constants, these estimates will be identified in the second stage (Table 4). Therefore,
the first stage results of the sorting model for the two triggers are the same. The effect of the interaction
term with the post CMS CoP variable will allow differentiation between the two models. While the first
stage results use the same sample as in the CL, the second stage regressions involves averages of the
explanatory variables.69 Moreover, centers’ share of patients are estimated. The model also incorporates

68

I elect to use the number of ECD transplants instead of total transplants volume because ECD transplants are indicative of an
increase in transplants volume at the center of interest relative to centers only performing SCD transplants.
69
The sample size decreases to 3,335 and the unit of observation reduces to the center‐report level.
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Table 4: Second Stage Sorting Equilibrium Model‐Selection of Transplant Centers
Variable

Graft Survival

Patient Survival

Constant

‐3.414***

‐3.393***

(0.932)

(0.932)

9.937***

9.890***

(0.923)

(0.918)

Average White

12.713***

12.729***

(0.364)

(0.364)

Average Black

12.033***

12.069***

(0.388)

(0.389)

1.400

1.435

(0.913)

(0.912)

Average ECD

Average Female
Average Highly Sensitized
Average Diabetes
Average BMI
Low Performance Graft Triggera

0.401

0.415

(1.425)

(1.425)

2.928***

2.946***

(0.825)

(0.825)

‐26.212***

‐26.352***

(3.377)

(3.377)

‐0.304
(0.348)

Post CMS
(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)

‐3.290***

‐3.270***

(0.149)

(0.145)

0.581
(0.482)

Low Performance Patient Trigger

‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)

‐‐‐

Share ( )

‐‐‐

‐‐‐
‐0.602
(0.372)
0.463
(0.524)

‐152.051***

‐153.006***

(16.061)

(16.007)

Number of Observations

3,335

3,335

R‐squared

0.403

0.403

Notes: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Triggers are based on the 3 non‐compliance thresholds
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the instruments for

constructed as combinations of exogenous attributes of centers other than center

in the decomposition of

.

Comparing between models, the effect of distance is robust across models. The signs of most coefficient
estimates in the first stage sorting models are different from the CL: Not accounting for center‐level
heterogeneity introduces omitted variable bias in the CL estimates. After demeaning the effects, I find
that candidates are more attracted to centers performing more ECD transplants, centers with more
higher‐risk patients (i.e. highly sensitized patients and high BMI patients). A log likelihood ratio test of the
two models (

=171,106 and the degrees of freedom is 3,335, representing the number of additional

parameters estimated in the sorting model) suggests that the sorting model better fits the data.
Considering the second stage estimation (Equation (2)) that decomposes the alternative‐specific constant
and introduces competitive interaction between centers in the estimation, I can identify the importance
of each covariate in determining centers’ attributes. Each coefficient

is a period specific constant.

Results shown in Table 4 imply that more ECD transplants and more White, Black patients, and more
patients with diabetes on a center’s waiting list increase its associated baseline utility. However, the
regulation effect estimated in the CL model are purged out in the second stage sorting equilibrium model.
The negative and significant coefficient on the share variable provides evidence for a congestion effect.
ESRD patients are less attracted to centers that already have a long waiting list. The congestion parameter
and insignificance of the CMS triggers in patient sorting also suggest that the negative effects estimated
in the CL for the CMS triggers are attributable to center‐level heterogeneity.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity Test of Change in the Regulation Effect across Patients’ Characteristics
Multinomial Logit
Variable
Distance (in 1000 miles)

Graft
‐17.701***

Sorting Equilibrium

Patient
‐17.711***

Graft
‐21.899***

Patient
‐21.922***

(0.033)

(0.033)

(0.022)

(0.022)

ECD

3.662***

3.699***

0.302***

0.290***

(0.018)

(0.018)

(0.021)

(0.021)

White

1.670***

1.659***

‐1.489***

‐1.968***

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.027)

(0.027)

Black

1.323***

1.331***

‐0.783***

‐1.125***

(0.027)

(0.027)

(0.030)

(0.030)

Female

0.157***

0.152***

‐1.985***

‐1.988***

(0.032)

(0.032)

(0.048)

(0.048)

Highly Sensitized

‐0.351***

‐0.508***

1.381***

1.427***

(0.055)

(0.056)

(0.065)

(0.065)

Diabetes

1.628***

1.661***

‐0.780***

‐0.519***

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.038)

(0.038)

BMI

‐2.148***
(0.108)

‐2.005***
(0.108)

21.854***
(0.127)

21.887***
(0.127)

Low Performance Graft Triggera

‐1.396***

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)

(0.274)
0.854***
(0.362)

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

‐‐‐

Low Performance Patient Trigger

0.521**
‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)

(0.256)
0.851***

‐‐‐
(Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(Highly Sensitized)

(0.349)

‐0.934***
(0.382)

(Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(Diabetes)

‐0.038
‐‐‐

‐1.398***
(0.178)

(Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(BMI)

6.379***
(1.089)

(Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(Highly Sensitized)

‐‐‐

(Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(Diabetes)

‐‐‐

(Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(BMI)
‐‐‐
(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(Highly Sensitized)

‐‐‐

2.273***
‐‐‐
‐‐‐
0.910***
(0.364)
‐0.683***
(0.179)
‐1.673*
(0.965)

0.728

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(Diabetes)

(0.310)
(0.153)
‐3.260***
(0.255)
‐‐‐
‐‐‐
‐‐‐

‐‐‐
‐‐‐
‐0.768***
(0.375)
2.009***
(0.196)
‐3.087***
(0.298)

4.730***

(0.527)

(0.503)

1.526***

‐3.703***
‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)*(BMI)

(0.298)

(0.214)

‐5.604***

1.376***

(1.445)
(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(Highly Sensitized)

‐‐‐

(0.372)

4.773**
(0.459)

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(Diabetes)

6.859***
(0.483)

0.246
‐‐‐

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)*(BMI)

(0.277)

‐4.596***
‐‐‐

‐4.454***
‐‐‐

Number of Observations
Log Likelihood (LL)‐value (0)
LL‐value (fitted value)
Notes: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Triggers are based on the 3 non‐compliance thresholds
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(1.328)

(0.326)
4.013***

‐‐‐

(0.491)

245,090

245,090

245,090

245,090

‐1,308,849

‐1,308,849

‐1,308,849

‐1,308,849

‐568,212

‐568,330

‐482,672

‐482,651

Table 6: Second Stage Sorting Equilibrium Results
Variable

Graft Survival

Patient Survival

Constant

‐3.578***

‐3.831***

(0.934)

(0.931)

9.787***

9.787***

(0.926)

(0.918)

12.976***

13.453***

(0.365)

(0.364)

12.563***

13.057***

(0.388)

(0.388)

1.208

1.201

(0.914)

(0.910)

0.25

0.261

(1.427)

(1.423)

2.900***

2.726***

(0.827)

(0.824)

‐26.890***

‐27.262***

(3.383)

(3.373)

Average ECD

Average White

Average Black

Average Female

Average Highly Sensitized

Average Diabetes

Average BMI

Low Performance Graft

Triggera

‐0.291
(0.349)

Post CMS

(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Graft Trigger)

‐‐‐

‐3.278***

‐3.307***

(0.149)

(0.147)

1.154***
(0.484)

Low Performance Patient Trigger

‐‐‐
‐0.481

‐‐‐
(Post CMS)*( Low Performance Patient Trigger)

(0.371)
0.675

‐‐‐
Share ( )

(0.523)

‐145.204***

‐149.674***

(15.960)

(16.025)

Number of Observations

3,335

3,335

R‐square

0.411

0.427

Notes: The standard errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a: Triggers are based on the 3 non‐compliance thresholds
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1. A Test for Heterogeneity in the Regulation Effect on Patient Mix
In a heterogeneity test, I investigate whether or not the response to the CMS CoP alters the mix of patients
at centers. I allow the effect of the regulation to vary by current waiting‐list patients’ characteristics such
as diabetes status, high sensitization, and average BMI: additional interaction terms between the Post
CMS CoP and each of these covariates are introduced in the regressions. The estimated coefficients from
these regressions are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
The CL model reveals that low‐performing centers on either patient or graft survival outcomes with a
higher proportion of highly sensitized patients and patients with diabetes are more attractive post CMS
CoP. However, the regulation effect is statistically significant for the triple interaction term with diabetes
for graft outcomes and for the triple interaction with highly sensitized for patient outcomes. Nonetheless,
the regulation is estimated to result in patients sorting away from centers with higher BMI patients under
the non‐competitive CL model.
Considering the sorting equilibrium first stage estimation, the regulation effects are not consistent across
models except for the effect of the CMS CoP on the mix of highly sensitized patients at low performing
centers. Findings from the sorting model suggest that the regulation leads to a higher likelihood of centers
being selected if they have a higher proportion heavier (high BMI) patients and have been flagged for both
graft and patient outcomes under the new regulatory environment. The estimated effect on diabetes
suggest that to the contrary, low‐performing centers with a greater proportion of patients with diabetes
are less likely to be selected post CMS CoP. These regulation effects are statistically significant at
conventional levels of significance. The discrepancies in the coefficient estimates are once again
attributable to omitted variable bias resulting from not accounting for competitive interaction among
centers in accurately identifying the CMS CoP effect on patient mix at centers. This heterogeneity test also
allowed us to investigate the welfare effects of the regulatory sorting. In fact if patients with poorer health
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or high‐risk patients (e.g. obese patients) tend to sort into centers that do not meet the CMS CoP
standards then this might further exacerbate the centers’ ability to meet the CMS CoP in the future. The
congestion effects estimates in the sorting equilibrium are robust to the new specification.
VI.

Conclusion

As part of the CMS objective to introduce a culture of accountability in the health care environment, the
CMS subjects transplant centers to new CoPs for Medicare certification. Report cards providing quality
information on center performance are used for evaluation purposes. These reports are also publicly
available online to prospective transplant candidates who could use them to make better informed
decisions about the quality of care their want to receive.
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which these quality information influence competition among
transplant programs in the midst of the new regulatory environment. I take advantage of data before and
after the regulation change and estimate the probability that centers would be selected based on patients’
characteristics and center‐specific attributes. Finding from a CL model imply that patients sort away from
programs that do not perform to the CMS standards on graft survival outcomes. However, estimates from
a sorting equilibrium model suggest instead that these results do not reflect a regulatory effect but are
mostly due to center‐level heterogeneity. These latter results concur with previous findings that
demonstrated minimal use of quality information in hospital choice. Factoring in the competitive aspect
of centers’ operations, I identify a strong congestion effect in predicting centers’ choice. All else constant,
estimates of congestion effects provide evidence that patients are more concerned with the size of a
center’s active waiting list than the quality of care provided.
I also find travel time to be in an important factor in center valuation with patients being drawn to centers
that are in proximity to their place of residence. Racial composition and other demographic characteristics
of a transplant program’s waiting list are found to be important for prospective transplant candidates.
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Further heterogeneity tests show that the regulation does affect the composition of patients mix at
centers. In light of earlier results on the effects of the CMS regulation on provision of care and access to
transplantation in chapter II, I can conclude that the regulation has a greater impact on the supply side of
the market with a substantial decrease in transplants volume than it does on the demand for
transplantation.
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Conclusion
The prevalence of ESRD in the U.S. is slowing down but still increasing. One of the main factors feeding
into this growth is obesity which increases the risks for chronic diseases such as diabetes and
hypertension, the two proximate causes of ESRD. This increase will lead to more individuals being
registered on the DDWL for kidney transplantation. With the gravity of the disease and the scare organs
available to meet the growing demand, policy makers and health care providers are designing and defining
rules and policies to maximize outcomes of transplant candidates. In this dissertation, I am examining the
effectiveness of two such rules and the behavioral responses of participating agents.

The first rule explored has been defined by transplant centers to incentivize obese transplant candidates
in becoming healthier by losing weight as a pre‐requisite for transplantation. Using a regression‐adjusted
difference‐in‐difference model, I find that obese patients do respond to the incentive of transplantation
by experiencing important weight loss during their time on the waiting list. Moreover, the estimated
weight loss registered for the severely and morbidly obese provides evidence for the importance of
saliency in performance rewards. Effectiveness of the intervention goes beyond the weight loss with
better graft survival for the severely and morbidly obese transplant candidates who lose weight as a
response to the BMI eligibility criteria.

The second rule evaluated is targeted toward transplant centers themselves. Here, the CMS is the
regulatory agency, which oversees performance of transplant programs. With the objective of making
centers more accountable for their performance, the CMS defined a set of CoPs effective on June 28,
2007. Report cards published by the SRTR are used under these rules to determine poor performance
status of centers. When flagged for low performance, transplant programs can incur the sanction of losing
certification for Medicare coverage. These new sanctions are very important because Medicare is the
primary insurance used by ESRD patients to cover their medical expenses. In fact, Medicare beneficiaries
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with ESRD accounted for 1.3% of the Medicare population and represented an estimated 7.5% of
Medicare spending, totaling over $20 billion in 2010 (CMS, 2014).

This regulation provided incentives for transplant programs to provide better quality services to patients.
An evaluation of the regulation demonstrates that although low‐performing centers increase the quality
of care with less organ transplant failure and waiting list death, I document substantial declines in volumes
of transplants and patient registrations. Since no evidence was found for a transfer in volume of transplant
and patient registrations to high‐performing centers, I am drawn to infer that the regulation led to
undesirable effects on patients’ health outcomes with a decrease in provision of care and access to
transplantation.

Still under the new CMS regulation, I seek to investigate whether patients’ use the quality information
available to them in making selection of transplant centers. In this joint research, I employ a competitive
sorting equilibrium model and find that patients make minimal use of centers’ report card when deciding
where to register. They do not fully exploit the information available to them on transplant programs and
quality of care. Important factors determining selection of transplant program include travel time (i.e.
distance to the center), racial composition of a center’s waiting list, high‐risk status of patients on a
center’s waiting list, and more importantly the size of the waiting list.

Results from this dissertation shed light on effectiveness of rules and regulations that govern the
transplantation environment. The main point to take away from these different analyses that incentives
are and will always remain important when seeking individual behavior change. Although desired effects
can be achieved, it is essential to recognize that trade‐offs inherent in policy making can lead to less than
desirable effects that need to be identified. Doing so will provide additional learning points for future
policies and rules in this environment.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Figure A1: BMI Distribution of UNOS Sample vs. U.S. Population (1999‐2010)
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Table A1: Duration Model of Transitions from the DDWL ‐Hazard Ratios (with Antigens)
Variables
Overweight at Listing

Obese at Listing

Severely & Morbidly Obese at Listing

Age at Listing

Age at Listing squared

Female

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other Ethnicity Category

College

Antigen A30

Antigen B53

Antigen DR11

Antigen DR13

Antigen DR15

Medicare

CMS Final Rule

Observations

Deceased Donor
Transplant

Living Donor
Transplant

Death

Other Causes

1.0058

1.0196*

0.8387***

0.8614***

(0.0073)

(0.0117)

(0.0086)

(0.0134)

0.9683***

0.9359***

0.7984***

0.7201***

(0.0092)

(0.0142)

(0.0088)

(0.0176)

0.7755***

0.7305***

0.7676***

0.7215***

(0.0139)

(0.0178)

(0.0114)

(0.0346)

1.0032

0.9677***

1.0267***

0.9679***

(0.0021)

(0.0026)

(0.0027)

(0.0043)

1.0000

1.0001***

1.0000*

1.0003***

(0.00002)

(0.00003)

(0.00003)

(0.00005)

0.8948***

0.9964

0.9835*

0.9723**

(0.0069)

(0.0100)

(0.0097)

(0.0112)

0.7863***

0.3742***

0.7243***

0.6544***

(0.0106)

(0.0105)

(0.0100)

(0.0186)

0.9285***

0.7419***

0.6549***

0.6663***

(0.0119)

(0.0240)

(0.0152)

(0.0237)

0.9617*

0.4938***

0.5437***

0.7349***

(0.0210)

(0.0175)

(0.0136)

(0.0302)

0.8010***

0.5835***

0.7012***

0.6901***

(0.0212)

(0.0275)

(0.0257)

(0.0356)

1.0468***

1.3736***

0.9575***

1.0234

(0.0111)

(0.0200)

(0.0104)

(0.0211)

0.9257***

0.9861

0.9752*

1.0179

(0.0094)

(0.0164)

(0.0132)

(0.0179)

0.9568***

0.9091***

1.0029

0.9626*

(0.0120)

(0.0205)

(0.0162)

(0.0212)

0.9770***

0.9861

0.9161***

0.8752***

(0.0077)

(0.0127)

(0.0094)

(0.0152)

0.9947

0.9873

0.9500***

0.8908***

(0.0095)

(0.0106)

(0.0110)

(0.0137)

1.0911***

0.9829*

0.9527***

0.8656***

(0.0102)

(0.0095)

(0.0112)

(0.0174)

0.9630***

0.5679***

1.2135***

0.9686

(0.0110)

(0.0083)

(0.0127)

(0.0209)

1.0045

0.9801

0.9230

1.5722***

(0.1118)

(0.0472)

(0.0544)

(0.2346)

376,982

376,982

376,982

376,982

Note: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level, are in parentheses. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Additional covariates include blood type (A, B, AB, with O being the reference category), an indicator for highly sensitized patients, medical priority, functional status, and
comorbidities (diabetes, hypertension, COPD). Coefficients on these covariates are available upon request.
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Appendix B
Table B1‐Change in Time to Failure of Organ Transplants‐Duration model (Hazard Ratios Reported)
(1)
Total Grafts

(2)
Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

0.7724a
(0.132)

0.8901
(0.137)

Observations

88,840

88,840

VARIABLES

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon request. Patient registrations
are the units of observation. Covariates include age, ethnicity (Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), patient age, patient BMI classification at listing, gender, college education, use of Medicare
as primary insurance, highly sensitized status, dialysis pre‐listing status, patient’s medical condition at listing including medical urgency, function status, and chronic diseases such as diabetes,
and COPD, year of listing effects, and center fixed effects.
a A hazard ratio less than zero means a decrease in the likelihood of transitioning through organ transplant failure.
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Table B2: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type‐High Performing Centers
High Performance
Graft

Patient

2.6911

2.8839

(1.846)

(3.136)

Outcome Variables
Transplants Volumea
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.919

0.918

0.3925*

0.0244

(0.222)

(0.312)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.507

0.504

‐0.1904

‐0.4610

(0.315)

(0.389)

Number of Graft Failures (within 1 year)b
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Number of Graft Failures (within 3 years)b
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.593

0.593

1.4662**

0.5646

(0.580)

(0.657)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.673

0.671

Number of Transplants from ECD Donorc
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. “After CMS Rule” takes the value of unity if
period
10 and 0 otherwise. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.
b Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of ECD transplants.
c Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of graft failures.
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Table B2b: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type‐High Performing Centers
High Performance
Graft

Patient

Coeff

Coeff

‐6.8888

‐5.2694

(7.772)

(8.956)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.834

0.834

‐2.6568*

‐0.2011

(1.382)

(1.403)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.602

0.596

4.5617**

7.9483***

(1.768)

(2.146)

Outcome Variables
Registrations Volumea
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Registrations Volume‐Highly Sensitized Patientsb
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Number of Deaths on the Waiting Listc
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.917

0.917

11.3694**

12.8282**

(5.447)

(5.740)

Observations

2,959

2,959

R‐squared

0.403

0.402

Number of De‐listings for all Other Causesc
CMS Final Rule * High Performance

Notes: Period and center fixed effects are included. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. “After CMS Rule” takes the value of unity if
period
10 and 0 otherwise. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and
number of graft failures.
b Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants, and number of graft failures.
c Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, and patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD).
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Table B3a: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of Graft Failures (within 1
year)
Total Grafts
‐0.4313*

‐0.4582*

0.0264

0.0138

‐0.1310

(0.248)

(0.248)

(0.212)

(0.211)

(0.295)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Subject to Quality Review

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

‐0.4658*

‐0.3759

‐0.1115

‐0.0246

‐0.1745

(0.274)

(0.291)

(0.203)

(0.212)

(0.378)

a

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Covariates

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of ECD transplants.
Specifications without period fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Table B3b: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of Graft Failures (within 3
years)
Total Grafts
‐0.4674

‐0.5562

0.2972

0.2457

0.0207

(0.395)

(0.396)

(0.306)

(0.309)

(0.433)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Subject to Quality Review

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

‐0.7090

‐0.5378

‐0.1195

0.0521

‐0.1613

(0.495)

(0.538)

(0.316)

(0.352)

(0.587)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of ECD transplants.
Specifications without period fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Table B3c: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of Transplants from ECD Donor
Total Grafts

Subject to Quality Review

‐0.7566*

‐0.7831*

‐0.5674

‐0.5761

‐0.4108

(0.416)

(0.424)

(0.376)

(0.380)

(0.644)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

‐0.7912

‐0.8313

‐0.3043

‐0.3821

‐0.3078
(0.909)

(0.670)

(0.681)

(0.531)

(0.542)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), and number of graft failures.
Specifications without period fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Table B3d: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of Deaths on the Waiting List
Total Grafts

Subject to Quality Review

‐1.9766**

‐1.9681**

0.0671

0.0339

‐0.8745

(0.766)

(0.779)

(1.083)

(1.088)

(1.517)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

‐1.2353

‐1.3101

2.5359

2.4874

1.9240

(1.154)

(1.130)

(1.669)

(1.658)

(2.396)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, and patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD). Specifications without period
fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Table B3e: Difference in Difference Estimation by Treatment Type with Inclusion and Exclusion of
Covariates and Fixed Effects
Low Performance‐Subject to Review
Outcome Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Registrations Volume
Total Grafts
‐6.5607**

‐6.8313***

‐1.6153

‐1.8944

‐6.1201

(2.538)

(2.483)

(2.108)

(2.061)

(6.489)

Covariatesa

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

Subject to Quality Review

Total Patients

Subject to Quality Review

‐9.0331**

‐9.2856**

‐0.0212

‐0.2316

‐0.0728

(3.936)

(3.813)

(2.911)

(3.000)

(10.504)

a

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

Center Fixed Effects

yes

yes

no

no

no

Period Fixed Effects

yes

no

yes

no

no

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

2,959

Covariates

Observations

Notes: Standard errors, in parenthesis, are heteroskedaticity‐robust and clustered at the center level. Inference: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients on covariates are available upon
request.
a Covariates include first lagged values for patient registrations by ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other ethnicity), average patient age, average patient BMI at listing, number of females,
Medicare patients, patients with private insurance, highly sensitized patients, patients with college education, and patients with chronic diseases (diabetes, COPD), number of ECD transplants,
and number of graft failures. Specifications without period fixed effects include the
indicator variable to preserves the difference in difference specification.
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Africa‐Waiver Program with Côte D’Ivoire. Ms. Ouayogodé also provided administrative assistance to
Project Link to Africa Coordinators, Ms. Sandra Francis and Dr. Doris Derby (Sep 2004‐May 2007).
Canadian Consulate General, Atlanta Georgia
Mariétou held the position of International Marketing Coordinator Intern at the Canadian Consulate (June
2006‐Sep 2009). She conducted a market study for the mainframe computer industry in the Southeastern
United States and uncovered actionable market information intelligence.
SERVICES
Ms. Ouayogodé volunteered at the Carter Center in Atlanta Georgia (Sep 2009‐Nov 2009). During her time
at the Carter Center, she provided administrative assistance and support to the staff in the volunteers’
office.
Mariétou also volunteered at the summer youth development program to children of refugees held by
the Refugee Resettlement and Immigration Services of Atlanta (RRISA) now known as the New American
Pathways (June 2009‐July 2009). Her duties consisted in assisting the lead teacher in the good
administration of the development program.
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